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

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Some Thoughts on the BRICS

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The articles in this issue of the Journal of Global Development and Peace are reflective of a larger process of global reordering that has been evident in 2015. As America's unipolar moment, initiated in the wake of the Soviet collapse in 1991, begins to recede, we have witnessed the growing prominence of rising powers in the form of the BRICS coalition of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa and a shift towards a more multipolar world. In this context, American predominance cannot be assumed and its involvement in regional challenges has become more selective and limited. The administration of Barack Obama, who is entering his final year in office, has sought to avoid committing the United States to costly military engagements that might overextend the country's resources, and also sought to "pivot" America's foreign policy attention away from the Middle East, which has lost much strategic importance in an era of domestic fracking and cheap oil, towards the Asia Pacific, which commands two-thirds of the world's global GDP. This repositioning has meant minimizing direct American military action to address security challenges emanating from the Middle East, such as the so-called Islamic State, and relying on regional players, including Turkey, the Gulf States, and European allies to lead such efforts. Meanwhile, America's global agenda has meant negotiating with new powers, such as China and Russia, throughout much of the world. These changes have created a much more complex and less predictable world that demands pushing beyond conflicting notions of America's role in global governance and giving greater attention to the interactions of rising and middle-sized players within and across regions.

In her article, Hanabeta Deshotel, charts the ever-evolving relationship between the United States and China, as these two powers, with distinctly different cultures, political institutions, and understandings of global affairs, have negotiated their bilateral relationship – finding opportunities for cooperation but also clashing over issues where their interests diverge or their actions are misunderstood. Toby Yasutake, who focuses on the trilateral relationship between Japan, China and Taiwan, finds that international relations in the Pacific are often more complicated than the bilateral relationship of the United States and China. Understanding a complex web of relations between regional players is also essential. Pepe Haba's article suggests that the relationship between China and Western powers, including not only the United States but also the European Union, ex-

tends far outside the Asia Pacific region where Ethiopia and other African countries seek economic and political models as well as material support as they shape their national development programs. Oluwatosin Akegbejo-Samsons additionally finds that ideas emanating from the global South, namely the microfinancing concept of Bangladeshi economist Mohammed Yunus, have become embedded in global finance regimes and applied to reconstruct and stimulate development in post-conflict states such as Sierra Leone. Finally, Rebecca Bruckenstein's article on educational and sports visas has revealed that soft power initiatives between the United States and Cuba have helped pave the way for friendlier and more cooperative relations between countries with traditionally adversarial relations. These efforts culminated in the opening of formal diplomatic relations between the United States and Cuba in 2015 – an important step that will stand as a component of Barack Obama's foreign policy legacy.

Steve Hess is an Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Bridgeport's College of Public and International Affairs and co-Managing Editor of the Journal of Global Peace and Development.

If Giants Tussle: Future of China-U.S. Cooperation

Hanabeta Deshotel, University of Bridgeport

Abstract

Operating under the premise that favoring cooperation over conflict leads to peace and stability for each side of a bilateral relationship, this paper explores the number and quality of cooperative exchanges between the People's Republic of China and the United States: cultural, academic, economic, and security-related. Since China's "opening" to the world in the 1970's, the United States has been a key partner and competitor, and as the world's two current major powers and economies, and representatives of two major cultural spheres, the relations between China and the United States consequently influence international relations on a large scale. Presented are cooperative exchanges as a foundation for the necessary soft power for each of these two nations to influence the other's policy towards itself and possibly create a larger co-policy towards other nations, especially developing nations, or nations or non-states in conflict. How the United States and China act together or separately will determine much of future trends in development and security. Indicators of cooperation, in addition to the number of exchanges, include joint measures within multilateral institutions and public opinion polls. In today's global climate, and with today's information technology, it is nearly impossible for any government, whether one- or multi-party, to operate in a vacuum, without influence from citizens themselves. Many citizens are educated and vocal, and their opinions on business and national policies can affect their own nation's course, as well as that of other nations.

Biography

Hanabeta Deshotel is a graduate of the University of Bridgeport, College of Public and International Affairs. She holds a master's degree in East Asian and Pacific Rim Studies and a master's of Education. In 2015, she completed an internship in South Korea with the non-governmental organization PSCORE, which assists North Korean defectors and is an NGO holding consultative status with the United Nations Economic and Social Council. Her research interests include interactions between East Asian states and the United States; Korean reunification; women in politics; and educational reform.

Background

It is a well-known maxim that, "when giants tussle, everyone gets flattened." The United States has stood at the pinnacle of diplomatic, economic, and military power for decades, and the People's Republic of China is poised to take a similar position in East Asia and the Pacific and to exert more global influence. However, both powers, established and developing, are much too aware of the harm a China-U.S. conflict would inflict on neighbors, allies, and economic partners in the region, let alone themselves, to come to blows over who will have supremacy. Both have stabilizing (and aging) populations, both have deterrent-capable militaries and nuclear weapons, and since the onset of a globalized economy, both are aware that more than ever before economies are interconnected and do not function well during conflict. However, it is well to keep in mind that there are tensions and unresolved issues that can stand in the way of a more productive cooperation.

During the Cold War, China and the United States. saw each other as a "secondary threat;" the USSR was the main focus of both nations' foreign policy.[1] Now, however, though the United States has done much to assist in China's development (capital, technology transfer, etc.), these two superpowers view each other warily. It has been agreed that it is in the interests of both to cooperate, yet numerous issues stand in the way of a true and lasting partnership, such as the Taiwan issue, North Korea, energy security, nuclear weapons proliferation, human rights, and environmental issues, among others.

For three decades, during the Cold War, China's foreign policy was shaped almost exclusively by its interactions with the USSR.[2] China chose to "lean East" partly due to the exclusion of China from the "Free World," as defined by the Acheson line of 1950. Reasons for the split between the communist parties of Russia and China in 1960 are as follows: Mao began to see the relationship with the Soviets as a threat to his regime and "cult of personality," the relationship between the USSR and the United States seemed to be transforming (and warming), there was disillusionment about the Soviet economic model, and Mao saw the USSR's new policies as more of a threat to China than Stalin's had been.

On the flip side, the USSR had begun to view China as a threat and was wary of China slowly taking over the Soviet Far East and had a hard time trying to balance the United States militarily in Asia. China had successfully tested nuclear weapons and most of all, and "most nightmarish,"[3] the USSR feared China cooperating with the United States. When China did come to new terms with the United States in 1972, it was finally safe from U.S. and Soviet attack, it gained the seat at the U.N. from Taiwan, and was now free from international economic isolation. After the break-up of the USSR in 1991, China's foreign policy swung to focus on the United States.

Chinese policy has changed according to who was in power/in office in China: Mao Zedong (1949-76), Deng Xiaoping (1978-92), Jiang Zemin (1989-2002), Hu Jintao (2002-2012), or Xi Jinping (present). Even with leaders of different styles, Chinese foreign policy has been known for its consistency of vision and its flexibility.[4] And leaders have had successively less absolute power than their predecessor. More power is held now by different institutions, rather than one person at the top. It is interesting to note, however, that due to China's large population, even a city-level leader has quite a bit more power than a counterpart in many other

countries. For example, a city leader in China may be in charge of a city as large as New York City, and a leader at the county level may be in charge of a population larger than some American states.

The key goals of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), of which all leaders are a part, are: to grow the economy, to control population growth, and to prevent social unrest. These goals drive all policy, but though the party has one "line," we must note that local governments seek to accomplish these goals in a variety of ways, thus the diversity apparent in dealing with human rights and environmental issues. Nathan and Scobell state, "China [is able] to pursue a more strategic foreign policy than most other countries… But the high centralization of power also creates some span of control problems."[5]

Both Mao and Deng gained power from being closely allied with the military, and both had to deal with a certain amount of factionalism. Deng made changes that opened China up to globalization, and he set certain standards of office, such as leaders observing their terms of office and retiring before dying in office. As far as the current status of the military, it is still an integral part of the Chinese government; it is described as one of three "pillars of authority," the other two being the state and the CCP. The importance of the military has continued since 1967, when the army restored order, and in fact administered every major governmental institution after the Cultural Revolution. People's Liberation Army (PLA) officers today are known as being conservative and nationalistic. This is an important consideration when looking at the tensions between the United States Navy and the PLA Navy in the South China Sea, for example. The decision to escalate rather than diminish tensions may stem from having a disproportionate voice coming from the military in either or both countries. And as for those "at the helm" in China, because there are now more voices, more institutions, such as the Central Leading Small Groups (CLSG), it is almost impossible to point to only one that runs foreign policy.

Deng Xiaoping ushered in a new era of free market economy, Special Economic Zones (SEZs), more travel and educational exchanges.[6] He famously said, "Poverty is not socialism." And it was necessary for China to open up to the world economy especially, because it needed capital and new technology. Of course, opening up, or "letting the flies in," also brought problems, such as corruption and inequality. Also, under the previous system, jobs were guaranteed; now, due to market forces, many people face job insecurity. Before, there was a large social safety net, but now, welfare services were reduced.

We also witnessed at this time large student- and worker-led protests such as the 1976 Tiananmen Memorial Incident and 1979's Democracy Wall. These protests were enacted because the pace of reform was seen as being too slow. The 1989 Tiananmen protest sought to influence policy on several issues: transparency, freedom of press, education, jobs, travel, and so forth. The decision to impose martial law, the crackdown, was mostly against the citizens involved in the protest, rather than the students, because they were seen as a greater threat to the CCP.[7] This was a major obstacle to the China -U.S. relationship for years. The United States imposed economic sanctions on China that were not lifted until 1993. In the 1990's, China faced many challenges including: a growing population, migration to urban centers, the disaffection of minorities, and so forth.

China's growth for the past 20 years has been

fueled by two things: a declining fertility rate and increased urbanization, both of which increase productivity, but will also both meet an inevitable endpoint.[8] Further obstacles to China's growth are political, environmental, and structural. To move up the value-added chain (design, invention, etc.), China will need to develop a more open political system and civil society. Attention to intellectual property rights can also contribute to a domestic knowledge-based economy and sustained economic growth. And civil society groups (including religious groups) can act as a safety net when the nation experiences economic difficulties.[9] In addition, China will have to deal with environmental degradation. Finally, and most importantly, China will have to overcome the obstacle of having a population that lives longer and has fewer children. Productive adults will be spending more time caring for elderly parents, which necessitates a switch from high-productivity manufacturing to low-productivity health services.[10]

Babones predicts that China in 2020 will have a per capita GDP comparable to Brazil, Mexico, and Russia.[11] As of 2015, according to the World Bank, Brazil, Mexico, and Russia all have GDPs above $10,000, while China is at $6,800.[12] There is a limit to China's growth. And fears that China will act the hegemon are unnecessary because China will be focusing on meeting its own people's needs and will be "an important but not all-powerful participant in the global system."[13]

Literature Review

One indication of more cooperative ties between China and the United States is the number of academic exchanges. Since the 1970's, China has encouraged students to go abroad for higher education. For the United States, China is now the largest source of international students. According to the Institute of International Education, the number of Chinese students in the U.S. (2014 report) is 274,439, which is 31% of all international students.[14] There are a growing number of students from the United States studying in China as well: 14,887 of them, which makes the United States China's fifth largest source of international students (5.4%).[15] These students who study abroad in the United States and China will be the forerunners of change in their societies, through their understanding and overcoming cultural assumptions.[16] They are making a financial investment in their own futures and in the future of China-U.S. relations.

Of more immediate and visible importance is the economic cooperation between the two powers. Gartzke, Li, and Boehmer consider that in today's economy, attention to investment must be given precedence over trade (there is a greater volume of the former compared with the latter), and the need for confrontation and military violence has been done away with, as powers can use "signaling" via economic channels to "signal" their approbation or disapprobation of the other's policies.[17] Incentives for violence are also reduced because "political shocks to capital market equilibria invariably imply capital flight."[18] These researchers emphasize the importance of economic ties and conclude that there is evidence "that liberal economics may be at least as salient to peace as liberal politics."[19]

Nolt hails the entrance of China into the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001 as a positive step[20] and stresses that China relies heavily on the global market and good relations with the United States.[21] Sutter agrees and makes the point that China's Asian and Pacific neighbors do not wish to choose sides between China and the United States, but

seek good relations with both. "For many year, Chinese leaders… [showed] a strong and overt opposition to the United States and its policies… However, [they] came to recognize such a tough public stance against the United States could damage [China's] interests."[22] Jisi Wang looks forward to U.S.-China joint energy projects and the building of nuclear power plants,[23] but also warns, "In terms of state-to-state affairs, China and the United States cannot hope to establish truly friendly relations. Yet the countries should be able to build friendly ties on nongovernmental and individual levels."[24]

It has been stated that in the realm of security, what is necessary between China and the United States is high-level military contacts. Campbell and Weitz chart the history of contacts being suspended (as after 1989 Tiananmen Square) or resumed (as in 1993): "External developments repeatedly led one side or the other to suspend military contacts as a form of signaling or retaliation, in effect holding them hostage to the larger political relationship."[25] What is important is that there is always a dialogue; each has different goals for the dialogue: China seeks to influence U.S. policy on Taiwan, for example, and the United States seeks to reassure Pacific allies, but lines of communication should be kept open. There are conflicting views on the desired level of contacts and exchanges. Christensen reports that in 2008 there were more high-level military contacts than previously,[26] while Nolt reports that contacts resumed in the 1990's were fewer than in the 1980's.[27]

Jisi Wang states that with military exchanges between (or among) states, such as joint military exercises or observations, most important is "where the weapons are aimed."[28] Exercises held between the United States and one of China's Southeast Asian neighbors, for example, can make China nervous. Enzioni warns that both the United States and China should hold no joint exercises with China's neighbors, but treat them as a "buffer zone."[29] Campbell mentions developments such as exchanges between United States and Chinese military educational institutions, agreements to not use nuclear weapons against one another, and the presidential hotline established in 1998.[30]

There are differing opinions on the efficacy of Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs), but cooperation in the areas of environmental preservation and humanitarian aid are viewed as starting points,[31] especially to guard against severe reactions to political shocks such as the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait missile crisis, the 1997 U.S.-Japan defense guideline revisions, the 1999 bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, and the 2001 U.S.-China military plane collision near Hainan Island.[32] Mutual trust is also difficult due to a perceived lack of military transparency on the part of China,[33] and the United States seemingly wanting to undermine China's goal of reuniting with Taiwan. It is well to keep in mind however, that on the topic of transparency, there are contrasting views even within China. In the 1990's, Chinese civilian analysts were in favor of more transparency, but the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and the CCP favored uncertainty;[34] they did not wish to "show their cards." "Besides a general lack of enthusiasm for enhancing military transparency, the Chinese likely did not want to draw attention to their strategic buildup and feared exposing vulnerabilities to a potential foe, particularly given Washington's plans to develop ballistic missile defenses."[35]

Also, in the case of China, where the PLA plays an integral role in government, and in the United States, where military voices are also well represented, we must consider that

there are actors who benefit from tensions and crises more so than cooperative and peaceful relations. For example, "because highlighting a U.S. threat helped sustain robust defense spending, the Chinese military had an institutional incentive to sustain an unfriendly relationship."[36] The same could be said about U.S. military spending and a "Chinese threat." Regardless, CBMs will doubtless continue as long as U.S. commitments in the Pacific remain and China relies on the U.S. Navy to assist in policing sea lanes.[37] China and the United States have been able to cooperate on the unobjectionable Container Security Initiative (CSI), wherein shipping containers are screened at ports in the region including Shanghai, Shenzhen, and Hong Kong.[38]

The biggest military players, of course, in China-U.S. relations are their respective navies. In the near future, according to Robert Kaplan, navies will be less necessary for war maneuvers and will be kept primarily to combat piracy and protect shipping lanes, as well as to assist in disaster relief.[39] Just like NATO was formed to resist the Soviet Union, it is possible that a "NATO of the Indian Ocean" will be formed to take on these modern marine challenges. Kaplan believes it more likely that regional alliances will take on this role. However, considering the successes of the NATO alliance, it is not improbable that it could be repeated in Asia, perhaps even including East African states, Australia, and the United States, along with Indian Ocean neighbors China, India, Iran, and Pakistan. It is unclear at this point whether such an undertaking would be led by China, the United States, or some other actor. Cronin *et al.* say,

It now appears that the U.S. sea services… may fall below the numbers and capability necessary to maintain order… The Indian Navy and China's People's Liberation Army Navy…remain works in progress. Neither… New Delhi nor even Beijing appears willing or able to oversee the [maritime] commons beyond its regional environs. Washington is therefore attempting to build a U.S.-led coalition or coalitions to superintend good order at sea.[40]

The United States is unlikely to develop a broad maritime-security coalition, given Chinese opposition and the wicked problems afflicting the region. In addition, Southeast Asian governments are unlikely to join a coalition that excludes China, for fear of antagonizing their increasingly powerful neighbor.[41]

One of the most recent military agreements between China and the United States has been the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) On the Rules of Behavior for the Safety of Air and Maritime Encounters, from 2014. President Xi and President Obama also signed in 2015 an annex to the agreement, which specifies not only rules of behavior, but also rules of communication, for designating warning areas and for coordination during emergencies.[42] There are also hopes that China and the United States can work together to combat the transnational threat to cyber-security. Tiezzi reported, "[A] new bilateral dialogue was one of the highlights of Xi's visit to the United States, and will represent the highest-level regular talks on cyber issues between the U.S. and China."[43] Additionally, in 2011, China drafted, and submitted to the United Nations, a code to limit cyber-arms.[44]

Another category of exchanges are those that take place within multilateral institutions. China and the United States interact via the United Nations, the World Bank, the IMF, and the World Trade Organization (WTO). They are both parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

There is evidence that China wishes to reshape such institutions to be more favorable to its own policies, and it has established new alternative economic institutions.[45] There is trepidation in some circles that China perhaps wishes to "challenge" what is seen as the world order. Nolt cautions that China should not be compared with "challenging" nations of the past: "During the 1930's, Germany, Japan and Soviet Russia… tried… to create autarkic economic empires that would enable them to pursue their nationalist aims with little regard for the broader economic consequences."[46] China and the United States are both aware of the interconnectedness of theirs and global economies. China conforms, as far as it sees conducive to their national interest, and does not seek to be a global hegemon. Indicative of the (perceived) effectiveness of cooperative exchanges between China and the United States, and how likely their respective publics would be receptive to further cooperation, are public opinion polls to ascertain positive and negative views of each nation. Policy today is influenced to varying degrees by public opinion, and perceptions matter. Even in a one-party state like China, the public is becoming more vocal, and the government must have some level of responsiveness to maintain legitimacy and thus, sovereignty.

Kwon found that in the United States (three Midwestern states were under study), perceptions of China (whether or not China was considered a threat) varied according to age, level of education, political party affiliation, and the respondent's main information source.[47] Younger respondents felt that China was less of a threat than older respondents, those with a lower level of education felt less of a threat, Democrats or Liberals felt less of a threat than Republicans or Conservatives, and those who got their information from the Internet or newspapers (screened sources) felt less of a threat than those who favored television or radio (unilateral sources). The Pew Research Center Global Attitudes Survey 2015 found that the younger generation in both the United States and China had more positive views of the other nation. Of 18- to 29–year- olds in China, 59% had a positive view of the United States, and 55% of the same age group in the United States had a positive view of China. For 30- to 49-year-olds, 45% (view of the U.S.) and 41% (view of China) had positive views, and those over fifty had 29% and 27%.
Sutter qualifies that opinion polls can be influenced by "unbalanced media and scholarly assessments".[48] Wang and Shoemaker put it this way:

"The mass media influence public opinion. Since most Americans lack direct experience with China, they rely on media news to make their judgments. When China/US is covered more positively in the US/China media, Americans/Chinese tend to hold more favorable opinions toward it, while negative coverage may make them perceive China/the US in an unfavorable light."[49] Nolt qualifies also, saying that public opinion is influenced by "hardliners,"[50] and Entzioni suggests undermining such "war hawks" by having the United States and China further clarify their positions on the Taiwan issue.[51]

Soft Power and Cooperation

Considering the various types of exchanges that China and the United States engage in, there is ample opportunity for the two powers to exert soft power on one another and attract the other to their view. Through interactions, each will influence the other's policy towards itself, and in order to expedite cooperative actions (economic, environmental, humanitarian, anti-piracy, etc.), there may be a chance to develop a co-policy towards oth-

er states and actors. Types of exchanges, or public diplomacy, favored by both China and the United States are: academic/educational exchanges, cultural exchanges (including the arts and sporting events), and the use of media.[52] China, for example, has new cultural capital due in large part to the 2008 Beijing Olympics, the 2010 Shanghai Expo, the Confucius Institutes, and international interest in the Mandarin language.[53]

China, as it grows and asserts itself, "searches for security," and tries to secure its interests, has learned the importance of soft power in relating with neighbors and securing interests more easily and efficiently. China, along with other nations, takes a lesson from the United States after its shows of hard power have had little success. Nathan and Scobell attribute this to the "failings of [America's] individualistic culture,"[54] and Melissen stresses that just as important as the "message" is what you are "selling," meaning, that if a nation's policy does not match up with its rhetoric, it will have a hard time winning "hearts and minds."[55]

"In the arena of public and elite opinion, the enhanced popularity of Chinese government policies as well as the pull of China as a center of Asian trade networks in recent years indicates that China exerts greater soft power and related influence in Asia. At the same time… the ability of China and the United States to get [Asian] governments to do things they would not be inclined to do… [is] an important way to assess influence. The record shows that China demonstrates little such influence, whereas the United States does."[56]

Why is it that appreciation for a nation's culture does not always translate into tolerance for its ideals and policies? The value of culture for increasing soft power is recognized in China, the United States, and the world over. Cultural exchanges are planned and executed every year. But familiarity with art, music, historical and cultural treasures, and cuisine does need a firmer foundation. After all, American food, music, and movies are enjoyed many places where American ideals are unpopular. What is the necessary foundation? Could it be people-to-people contacts? Scholars, business people, civil servants, and military personnel are meeting and getting to understand one another. Meeting and talking with just one person from another country gives an entirely different perspective of the culture, customs, and goals of that country. China has the right idea encouraging a more open society with much travel to, and cooperation with, other countries.

When Joseph Nye coined the term "soft power," he stated that it was comprised of several things: cultural attraction, economic prosperity, smart diplomacy, technological innovation, and political values.[57] China seems strong on the first three, improves quickly in innovation, but as far as political values, and in the case of its Southeast Asian neighbors (its policies with regards to maritime territory), it is still less than attractive to many. So while China spends billions on soft power: cultural institutes, media, and events, it is important to remember that unfavorable policy decisions can undercut your soft power. Again, the message and the policy need to match.

It is a well-established principle that governments must enact programs of public diplomacy in order to boost their soft power, or "attractiveness," to other nations and publics. Today, soft power, though experts acknowledge the difficulty of measuring its effects, has the capacity to enhance military and economic influence, or even exceed that influence. With so many overlapping strategic

interests, widely integrated economies, and a global public more aware, educated, and savvy, it is impossible to ignore one's standing in world public opinion. A positive image can well mean the difference between seeing a key interest met or not. And a negative image puts so many noisy, expensive, and time-consuming obstacles in the way.

The subject of soft power gets sticky when we consider human rights. China's human rights record has been one of its major obstacles in raising itself in world opinion (or at least, in U.S. opinion). There is a debate going on about the universality of human rights and whether some rights are favored over others according to a Western-centric view, for example, individual rights over the state's right to noninterference, or the right to certain standards of living over "right to development." There has also been some difficulty in determining responsibility for worldwide environmental pollution. Some point to China as a "worst offender," but many in China want to continue developing unhindered in order to "catch up" with developed countries. It takes much negotiation to determine who and what will be capped, and at what level.
Leaders in China have sought to export China's particular "brand" of economic development. The "Beijing Consensus" has been put forward as a "distinctive" economic model in juxtaposition with the "Washington Consensus." We can clarify this by saying that the model is not entirely distinct, as it follows many of the elements of the Washington Consensus, including: fiscal discipline, a competitive exchange rate, liberalized trade, and foreign direct investment. In addition, much of China's economic success has stemmed from the utilization of technology from outside of China.[58]

When considering China's relations and concerns with its neighbors and the international community, a useful paradigm is the "Four Rings," wherein the First Ring comprises everything that is part of China (Taiwan, etc.), the Second Ring China's contiguous neighbors (Vietnam, India, etc.), the Third Ring the regional groupings China's neighbors are a part of (Southeast Asia, South Asia, etc.), and the Fourth Ring everything outside the first three rings (Africa, Europe, etc.) The United States may be considered as concerned in all the Four Rings, as a Pacific power and China's very important partner/competitor. China has a voice in the Fourth Ring, but it limits itself out of necessity to two spheres, economic and diplomatic. As long as Fourth Ring regimes keep China's interests in mind, China does not involve itself in the regime's ideology or domestic politics (policy of noninterference).[59] Some of China's controversial economic and diplomatic partners include: the Palestine Liberation Organization and Iran. Today China nurtures such relationships for the purposes of: energy security, access to markets, arms sales, and to isolate Taiwan and the Dalai Lama diplomatically, and so forth. Because of this pragmatic approach, China has something of a negative public image in the United States. It appears as if Chinese business is ignoring or exacerbating conflicts and does not pay enough attention to humanitarian issues.

It has been the aim of some actors in the United States to convince China that unconditional loans to corrupt governments keeps those governments corrupt, that conditionality improves governance, and good governance leads to sustainable economic growth. The other side of this debate is that, as a relative late-comer to international loan-granting, China has little choice about whom it grants loans. Towards the end of improving public image, China will need to continue its humanitarian assistance and amp up its cultural

exchanges, for example, the establishment of "Confucius Institutes." Once again, with today's modern technology and media, the global public is more aware and in tune with what goes on politically and economically in every corner of the world, and the global public speaks with a loud voice. It is not enough today to have politicians and businessmen on your side' you need the favorable opinion of the public to accomplish your ends.

Much has been said (in favor and against) China's establishment of Confucius Institutes throughout the world, 465 in total, in 123 countries; 97 of them are in the United States.[60] These institutes are useful vehicles for promoting Chinese language and culture, and understanding between cultures, and many universities welcome their establishment, universities which might otherwise not have the resources for such an endeavor. Others see them as mere arms of the Chinese government and resent their apparent stifling of freedom of thought and speech within an otherwise private and independent academic institution. The Confucius Institute at the University of Chicago has been discontinued over the matter, but many remain operational.[61]

It has been recommended that the United States learn from and continue previous successful strategies of engaging with China, to maintain a strong U.S. military presence in the Pacific in order to discourage coercion of other Pacific states, and to use "constructive economic and diplomatic policies."[62] This is viewed as the best course for overall security and prosperity in the region. A strong U.S. military presence has taken the form of increased deployments and new alliances and security partnerships. These are seen as necessary to make diplomacy more effective. It will take much diplomatic effort, and an avoidance of confrontation, to persuade China that the United States is not actively working to slow its growth or diminish its role. Two of China and the U.S.'s formal dialogues are: the Strategic Economic Dialogue about economic and environmental issues, the Senior Dialogue about political and security issues,[63] and the Human Rights Dialogue.[64]
Key questions to consider are: What does China want from the United States? What does the United States want from China?[65] China wants the United States to recognize China's unique role and to not handicap its sovereignty. The United States wants China to be a good economic partner and "global citizen." It wants China's help on such issues as: terrorism, nonproliferation, Middle East conflicts, and norms of trade and finance.[66] "China can best win increased power and prestige… through cooperation with the international community in common endeavors."[67] It is yet to be seen whether China will display the level of transparency and coordination the United States wants to see with regards to international, multilateral institutions such as the IMF and World Bank. It is likely that Chinese leaders will make a bid for utilizing instead new institutions, Asian Institutions, such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank.[68] But it can be argued that some degree of cooperation with the United States is important for China's economic prosperity and social stability.[69]

Similar to the concept of U.S. "engagement" with China is the concept of "peaceful evolution."[70] In the 1950's, this was a strategy used by the United States to try to shorten the life span of Communism. It encouraged private ownership, free markets, and liberal democracy. Today, however, in the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), there is less emphasis on ideology and more on pragmatism, and the cultural, social, and economic changes that have been observed since the administration

of Deng Xiaoping and onward can be considered part of a new kind of "peaceful evolution." Today's peaceful evolution is enacted through such means as educational and cultural exchanges and the media.[71] Peaceful evolution is looking successful because Chinese leaders recognized the need to modernize to avoid the fate of the USSR. What was needed was: loans, technology, expertise, and access to global markets, in sum, integration with the world economy.[72] What the CCP also needs is to enhance its political legitimacy, through material means, rather than ideological. Economic interdependence has meant an influx of liberal values and a possible challenge to the party, and thus, national, sovereignty, but to choose autonomy is to choose isolation. There is a contrast between "procedural legitimacy" and "performance legitimacy,"[73] and the CCP has chosen to embrace performance legitimacy.

There have been signs that China is willing at times to put aside its policy of noninterference and play the role of "good global citizen" as the United States desires. Examples include China's facilitating dialogue with the regime in Burma/Myanmar in 2007. China was able to convince Burma to accept humanitarian aid after the 2008 cyclone. Another example was the Six-Party Talks between 2003 and 2009 over North Korea's nuclear aims. With North Korea especially, China (and Chinese businesses) is/are crucial to seeing a peaceful resolution to this remnant of the Cold War.

Once political and ideological comrades, China and North Korea have not seen eye to eye as of late. This comes as a result of diverging ideologies and China's impatience with North Korea's disregard for international norms and even laws. However, amid disagreements over nuclear weapons and human rights, economic relations have found new channels between the neighbors. Chinese officials have chilled towards North Korea, but Chinese businesses seem to be applying a new kind of "Sunshine Policy," but instead of just aid, the "sunshine" is capital, bridges, roads, factories, and a gradual drawing in to a more liberalized economic model. From airport terminals to skyscrapers to banks, China is the engine behind North Korean construction.[74] Once again, some of the hairiest international issues will require China's and the United States' cooperation to solve.

Conclusion

The Republic of China and the United States, one an established power, and the other quickly rising, are rapidly coming to an impasse. They will choose to either conflict or cooperate, and due to the border-defying nature of today's most pressing issues terrorism, natural disasters, environmental issues, and so forth.— and considering the very interconnected nature of their very globalized economies, it would serve both nations, and their neighbors, for the two to continue and expand on existing cooperative exchanges: academic, cultural, economic, and security-related. Additionally, there is ample opportunity for soft power and public diplomacy to be utilized toward one another through such exchanges, cooperation within multilateral institutions, and efforts to improve public opinion. No one need be trampled under foot, and the future may be prosperous and secure for all nations, all "global citizens."

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Engagement of China, European Union, and the United States with Africa and its Implications for "Agenda 2063": A Case Study of Democratic Developmentalism in Ethiopia

Pépé François Haba

Résumé

L'article vise à évaluer à la fois l'État Démocratique et Développementaliste et la stratégie d'Industrialisation Reposant sur le Développement Agricole adoptés par le gouvernement Éthiopien depuis les années 1990. Bien que le taux de croissance du PIB atteint par l'Éthiopie depuis 2003 a stimulé la confiance des dirigeants dans leur stratégie de développement, le scénario réel existant en Éthiopie ne correspond ni aux caractéristiques d'un État démocratique ni à celles d'un État développementaliste. Malgré le mauvais record des violations des droits de l'homme et la persistance de la mauvaise gouvernance, les donateurs traditionnels et émergents continuent toujours à fournir l'aide au développement à l'Éthiopie. L'article propose une série de recommandations politiques nécessaires pouvant être pleinement mises en oeuvre par les partenaires au développement et le gouvernement Éthiopien afin les objectifs d'un pays à revenu intermédiaire soient atteints par l'Éthiopie et de ceux de l'agenda 2063 par l'Union Africaine.

Abstract

The article aims at assessing both the democratic developmental state and the agriculture development-led industrialization (ADLI) strategy adopted by the Ethiopian government since the 1990s. Although the GDP growth rate achieved by Ethiopia since 2003 has boosted leaders' confidence in their developmental strategy, the actual scenario existing in Ethiopia does not correspond neither to democratic nor developmental state features. Despite the bad record of human rights violations and the persistence of bad governance, traditional and emerging donors are still providing development assistance to Ethiopia. The paper proposes a set of policy recommendations that might be implemented by the Ethiopian government and its development partners in order to achieve goals set for middle income countries in the African Union's Agenda 2063.

Introduction

An economic report on Africa presented by the United Nations Economic Commission on Africa remarks that the effective strategy for a state in Africa to perform an efficient role in attaining a fast and sustained socio-economic development coupled with profound structural change has to be founded on a developmental state. The report also points out the conflicting nature between the policies employed in implementing the developmental state and those of the multilateral donors, such as adopting democratic values required to foster citizens' participation in the governance possess.[1] In addition, it is worth noting that throughout history, with no exception, the starting point of all the great high performing economies in the world—including the wealthiest—has been mainly the farming sector. Chenery and Moshe point out that during an economic growth that can induce structural transformation, transferring capital and labor from the farming sector is helpful for nurturing growth in the expanding sectors of manufacturing and other services of the economies in the developing countries. [2]

In this regard, the government of Ethiopia in the 1990s, impressed by the success of the developmental state regime adopted by many countries in East Asia (i.e. China,[3] Japan,[4] South Korea,[5] Taiwan,[6] etc.), decided to pursue a similar pattern of economic development by adopting simultaneously the democratic developmentalism (DD) and the agricultural development-led industrialization (ADLI) blueprint as the most important backbone for political strategies and structural transformation.[7]

This complex context poses a certain number of relevant research questions which include the following: Knowing the complexity for a developmental state to be democratized, does Ethiopia possess the prerequisites pertinent to establish a democratic developmental state? How does the trilateral development collaboration have to be designed and harmonized in order to establish standards required for the adoption, implementation, and sustainability of a democratic developmental regime in Ethiopia?

Broadly, this study aims to perform a comprehensive appraisal of the democratic developmental regime implemented in Ethiopia to inform policy and identify the directions for further research. In the attempt to widen the understanding of the challenges facing both the engagement of China with Western donors in Africa and the adoption of a democratic developmentalism, the practical relevance of this proposed research is to formulate policy recommendations that ought to inform development partners and policymakers to prop up a harmonious cooperation framework in providing foreign development assistance for building an Ethiopian democratic developmental regime, in particular, and in other African nations, in general.

Conceptual Framework

Democratic Developmentalism

According to Ohno, democratic developmentalism is "a political regime in which a developmental party remains in power for a long time by consecutively winning free elections which permit multiple parties, under which policies that punish rent seeking and encourage productive investment are implemented with a strong state guidance". [8]

Agriculture development-led industrialization (ADLI)

In the early 2000s, disappointed and reluctant

to embrace the traditional development paradigm, the interim government in Ethiopia adopted and implemented the ADLI as the main policy principle in promoting the country's national development. The adoption of the ADIL was triggered by the fact that Ethiopian society is recognized as an agrarian community where approximately 86 percent of its population are rural dwellers for whom land exploitation remains the predominant source of revenues. Considered as the unique spearhead for the developmental pathway of Ethiopia, ADLI was devised to eradicate poverty by means of accelerating and sustaining economic growth. It aimed to reinforce the relationship between the agricultural and industrial sectors, by helping the small-size farming peasant to grow their productivity, enlarging the agricultural activities for private commercial agricultural activities and building an industrial sector capable of engaging the human resources and exploiting the natural resources of the country.[9] The agricultural sector absorbs over 83 percent of the total population, represents 46.3 percent of the national gross domestic product (GDP), and produces more than 90 percent of the revenues from exports[10].

Triangular development cooperation

Although the concept of trilateral cooperation or triangular cooperation has not received universal agreement over its definition, it signifies the execution of aid projects that involve three sorts of partners: one or more traditional donors, one or more emerging donors, and the beneficiary country.[11] In the strategic plan for 2014-2017 as well as the memorandum of understanding for UNDP-China in 2010, the UNDP considers the triangular cooperation as the only fundamental strategy to establish and sustain South-South relations.[12]

Agenda 2063

Agenda 2063 is an agenda adopted by the Africa Union in 2013 in which point 29 focused mainly on achieving a democratic developmentalism in Africa by the year of 2063 and is formulated as follows:
Africa will be a continent where the institutions are at the service of its people. Citizens will actively participate in social, economic and political development and management. Competent, professional, rules and merit-based public institutions will serve the continent and deliver effective and efficient services. Institutions at all levels of government will be developmental, democratic, and accountable."[13]

Democratic Developmentalism Regime in Ethiopia

Within the literature on the democratic developmental state, it has been determined that a model for Africa should consist of the combination of three major intertwined elements including the fundamentals, the democratic pillar, and the development pillar.[14] Therefore, I use these three elements as the framework for the assessment of the democratic developmentalism as practiced in Ethiopia.

Fundamentals

The vision, commitment, and patriotism of the leaders are major fundamentals indispensable for the success of the democratic developmental state in Africa. Ethiopian leaders have envisioned a rupture from the previous socialism system in order to propel fast economic growth while at the same time secure political autonomy for each ethnic region.[15] They have considered economic growth as important element for acquiring political support across the country but also for gaining

both autonomy and prestige from others.[16] Meles Zenawi who led as an unchallenged leader of the government, expressed a strong commitment in the process of building the country.[17]

Another major fundamental is the development ideology which holds that the developmental state should remain the ideological underpinnings.[18] To replace the previous Ethiopian socialist system, the economic system based on free market has been adopted with a particular ideology called a revolutionary democracy."[19] In contrast to the liberal bourgeoisie, which can allow individual participation, accept a variety of opinions and interests, as well as a multiple representation, this revolutionary democracy is based upon a collaborative participation of the communities where agreement is established through debate chaired by the spearhead organization.[20]

The funding of the development is another fundamental. The government of Ethiopia receives billions of dollars yearly in international aid to fund development.[21] Higher level governments can also transfer funds to lower governments as a source of financial resources to adjust the balance of revenues versus disbursement assignment between the administrations at federal and regional levels. At the same time, the federal funds are allocated according to the needs and the revenue of each region.[22]

Also, the embeddedness is another fundamental. Embeddedness consists of establishing relationship with mutual benefits between a variety of sectors within the society, including civil society organizations, private sectors, interests groups, community based organizations, and so forth.[23] But in Ethiopia, many civil society organizations are founded and managed by a handful of people and depend mainly on foreign funding. There is only a hierarchical relationship (donor-beneficiary) with the communities in which they operate instead of a mutual partnership with an equal footing.[24] The country has some civil society actors involved in familiarizing citizens about democracy, also providing training in participatory politics, voter education, civic education leadership, democratic governance, and gender issues in a democratic regime. Other groups are engaged in building institutional capacities, enhancing the management system of the decentralized public finance, and establishing communication channels for the citizens to express their voices to their administrators in relation to the provision of the services.[25]

Furthermore, the state's autonomy is also an important fundamental. The assessment of the Ethiopian bureaucracy reveals that it is managed by qualified civil servants who possess clear defined responsibilities with the expectation to serve on the competitive basis. The recruitment of government employees and technocrats is meritocratic. However, the functionaries operate within a non-autonomous institutional system and entirely controlled by the rules of the incumbent elites. In numerous governmental services, the top positions are assigned on the basis of an ethnic quota method. They are hence expected to serve in conformity with their ethnic's orientation instead of pursuing the developmental goals of their agency. Consequently, this undermines transparency, prioritizes the fulfilment of the political project, and encourages corruption, which is now endemic in the sphere of Ethiopian bureaucracy.[26] The unmanageable impacts of the political intervention by the ruling elites prevent autonomy within the bureaucratic system, undercut impartiality, weaken professionalism, and provide favorable treatment by political cronyism and ethnic affiliation.[27]

The state's hegemony is also an important

fundamental that is often referred to the "war of position."[28] The current regime has adopted some nationalist themes in order to create a popular mobilization towards realizing national goals. These include the "war on poverty" and the "Ethiopian Renaissance Dam project." The dam project has become a nationalist project due to the way that the Western countries are blamed for their reluctance towards supporting the project, reanimates a protracted rancor against Egypt on the issue of the control over the Nile, and it finally appeals to the involvement of every citizen in Ethiopia with no exception of ethnic group.[29]

Democracy

The developmental state requires the implementation of a democracy pillar in several major blocks, including political and human rights, which turn around the confluence of political rights and civil liberties.[30] The success of democracy requires the rule of law, which encompasses the separation of powers along with the supremacy of the law and the equality before the law. In Ethiopia, the ruling party and its leaders monopolize all the political powers and the executive branch of the government. The country is characterized by a weak separation of powers where the executive branch controls the legislative and the judiciary branches and undercuts the "checks and balances" principle. The legislative branch in which the opposition party held only 1 percent of the seats has no influence on the decision making processes within the ruling government. The judiciary branch is influenced by the executive branch and has no ability and autonomy in terms of interpreting, monitoring and reviewing laws, legislation, and policies. There is no fair and timely justice for citizens because the judges are not able to render decisions free from the interference of the leaders of the ruling party.[31]

The country has neither mechanisms nor institutions protecting the rights of the citizens. Although the country has a variety of democratic institutions—judiciary courts, labor unions, civil society, and political party organizations—many of them are unstable and perform more poorly than expected in a democratic system.[32]

The prosecution of office abuse is also conducted inadequately because office holders affiliated to the ruling party who violate the law and are involved in corruption activity are not usually prosecuted correctly.[33] The violations of political and human rights are also widespread countrywide.[34] In the same vein, the freedom of expression, religion, assembly, and association is also threatened.[35]

Also, the establishment of a strong multiparty system is another crucial democracy pillar. Although there are over 60 registered political parties, there is a strict restriction on the opposition parties, which makes them unstable with no influence in the political debate and policies design. The diaspora groups backing the opposition are characterized by division and weakness.[36] The government's practice of repression and strategy of co-optation have weakened politically the interests groups. which has created an environment politically violent and unstable since 1998.[37]

Development

Ethiopia, previously centralized until the 20th century, has undergone twice a decentralization process. which has resulted in structural transformation in the administrative, fiscal, and political spheres.[38] In Ethiopia, the state is deeply involved in the economy to the point that the price of some products can be fixed by the government, as well as the devaluation of the currency, and the fixation of the exchanges rates in the way that can posi-

tively impact the economy. Moreover, there is no private ownership over land, and the banking system and the telecommunication services are also owned by the government.[39] With this strategy, the GDP has grown progressively from US $ 117 billion to 489 billion with a slight growth rate around 10 percent for the last decade. Additionally, the high GDP growth under the developmental state has been accompanied by a stable economic growth. In 2013, the rate averaged 10.3 percent, coinciding to the tenth consecutive year of fast growth.[40] The positive spillover of the GDP growth has been the reduction of the both the prevalence and the severity of poverty with a gap lowered more than 30 percent. However, the GDP growth achieved so far is mainly from the services sector (12.5 percent) rather from agriculture (9 percent) and industry (12,5 percent) as aimed by the policies adopted by the government for ADLI's approach.[41]

Also, an important development pillar is a strong domestic entrepreneurial class capable of serving as the key of the private sector. It is worth noting that the private sector has grown considerably with four private banks and the bank branches have increased from 562 to 970 between 2007 and 2010. In 2011, there were 30 institutions of microfinance. In 2001 there were 766 sectors of private manufacturing, which reached 1,766 in 2010, whereas the number of public manufacturing increased only from 143 to 164 over the same period.[42]

Another crucial development pillar is to invest in building of the infrastructure, including but not limited to roads, bridges, electrical grid, water supply, sanitation, and communications. The Ethiopian government has adopted a huge infrastructure development prioritizing transport and communications. Ethiopia, in addition to being a landlocked country, has non-navigable large rivers and no railway network. In such conditions, the government considered road transport as a crucial element for economic development and therefore adopted a strategy of huge public investment called the "Road Sector Development Program (RSDP)," which was implemented across the country between 1997 and 2010. The program has contributed to improvement of roads, which in turn has impacted favorably the trends of entry and the size of the manufacturing companies.[43] Considering the internet and the mobile phones, research shows that the numbers of subscribers for both communication tools have considerably increased after the adoption of the developmental state approach by the government.[44] The government has also developed and implemented energy policies to augment and branch out the sources of energy provision across the country.[45] Up until 2001, the energy production of Ethiopia was only 478 megawatts. From 2002 to 2012, the level of the production attained 1460 megawatts. Improving the well-being trough the provision of public goods is also a crucial element of the development pillar.[46] This encompasses enhancing the quality of life, the level of education, and the accessibility of resources. Ethiopia's human development index value has increased from 0.284 in 2000 to 0.435 in 2013, representing a 53.2 percent increase and averagingan approximately 3.34 percent yearly increase.[47]

In order to achieve universal health care envisioned by 2035, the government has adopted a variety of policies and strategies that aim to improve access to basic services that can provide fundamental health care and protect people from huge health expenditures. Study shows that these policies and strategies include the Ethiopian constitution, the health care policy, the health finance strategy, the health sector development plans, the Ethio-

pian essential health package, the regional health laws, regulations, and guidelines as well as the health insurance strategy. The increase of the health coverage was 20 percent between 1995 (40 percent) and 2002 (20 percent), whereas it increased by 29 percent from 2002 (60 percent) to 2010 (89 percent). The involvement of the government has also resulted in the exponential increasing number of health facilities with 246 in 1995, 412 in 2002, 655 in 2005. and 1,787 in 2010. Throughout the same period the number of hospitals has been respectively 73, 115, 131, and 200. [48]

In the sector of education, the number of schools built has increased along with the rate of student enrolment in higher education. In contrast to the neoliberal development strategy where higher education is costly and only available for the wealthy, the Ethiopian developmental state strategy has made it affordable and accessible to all citizens of the entire country.[49]

In a similar vein, the incidence of the poverty declined only from 49.5 percent to 41.9 percent between 1995 and 2002 whereas it reached 29.6 percent in 2010. The country has also performed successfully in other social welfare areas, which has contributed to the improvement of life expectancy at birth from 46.4 to 59.3 years between 1991 and 2011 despite prevalence of HIV/AIDS, civil war. and repeated famine in the 1990s. Interestingly, despite the recurrent cycle of droughts, the number of people receiving emergency aid has decreased since 2003 from 15 million down to 5.6 million.[50]

Agricultural development-led industrialization (ADLI)

The information on the assessment of the ADIL presented in this section is mainly obtained from research conducted by Samuel Gebreselassie.[51] At the beginning, the main target population of the ADLI was the owners of small farms, mainly the crop producers with the purpose to realize a fast increase in agricultural production, increase the income of rural dwellers, achieve nationwide food self-sufficiency, as well as the production of surpluses for the urban markets or the industrial sectors. The first step toward achieving this objective was engaging in land distribution. The assessment of land distribution and land tenure arrangements shows that land is unequally distrusted in Ethiopia. The surface of the land cultivated by most Ethiopians is less than 0.5 hectares. Furthermore, at the national level the average ownership of land is 1.02 hectares, the per capita average ownership is less than 0.20 hectares, and the distribution of farm unit size means that 63 percent of the farmers cultivate less than 1 hectare. A result of a land tenure survey conducted in 2001 presents a Gini-coefficient of 0.499 at the household level, 0.541 at per capita level, and 0.539 at adult equivalent. This figure diverges from the Taiwan's unimodal agriculture structure with an equal land distribution where four-fifths (80 percent) of its farms were within one acre of the average farm size unit of 1.2 hectares and the top 1 percent is just 11.5 times the mean farm size.

Another remarkable feature is that the bottom 10 percent of the population owns no land at all and the top 10percent own 39 percent of the total agricultural land mass. This unequal farm size distribution does not promote development of the sector because the small farmers have no opportunity to buy modern inputs needed for production method. This binominal agricultural structure contributes to curb the purchasing power of the small scale farmers while it directs the demand for manufactured goods for both pri-

vate consumption and inputs for large scale agriculture towards the foreign market.

Although the government has prioritized the agricultural sector by adopting the ADLI approach, the land ownership controlled by the state has impeded agricultural production. The interdiction of private ownership over land prevents the peasants from utilizing their assigned land for huge and long term profits and even discourages them to fully invest for improving productivity. The interdiction of the private land ownership oblige the peasantry to stay under the control of the state at the same time it protects the ethnic frontiers from disruption because the agglomeration of people to geographic areas defined on the basis of their ethnical background would be earnestly imperiled.

Another aim of the strategy was to create a linkage between the agricultural sector and the other non-agricultural sectors that can turn the agricultural sector into an engine of growth for the industrial development process. The domestic manufacturing sector provides 1.8 percent of the total demand for manufactured inputs (technology inputs, fertilizers, etc.) required by the agricultural sector. In contrast, the agricultural sector supplies 29.2 percent of its output as inputs in the domestic sector. This poor performance is due to the increased consumption of imported inputs (e.g. fertilizers) by the agricultural sector.

Another factor is the low purchasing power for manufacturing consumption goods due to the decreased productivity engendered by the low labor mobility in rural areas and the high population growth. The feeble competitiveness of the domestic industries is mainly due to the increased accessibility to inexpensive goods. For instance, the land distribution strategy has encouraged the development of the leather and leather products industries leading to a poor quality of hides generated by the agricultural sector. This poor productivity does not provide enough supply to the nascent manufacturing industries.

Another element of the strategy was adoption of the agricultural extension programs. The programs were executed by creating the participatory demonstration and training extension system (PADETES). The role of PADETES was to provide farmer households with inputs along with visits by development agents. Since its adoption, PADETES has remarkably contributed in reaching many farmers, increasing productivity, increasing grain production, increasing the use of fertilizer, and increasing the number the participation of farmer households in the extension programs. However, with the focus of the extension packages on cereal crop and production, animal production and income generating crop production have been neglected. Another flaw is the formulation of the extension package at the federal level with the lack of regional strategies characterized by limited infrastructure, fewer marketing aspects, weak training for extension workers, and limited use of packages by the farmers.

One policy of this strategy has been the *villagization* program. which consists of introducing socio-economic transformation by means of an agrarian socialism as well as mechanized and cooperative agrarian practices. However, the *villagization* has been essentially based in the regions which mostly need specific assistance and other supports.

Foreign aid

Ethiopia is today subjugated by foreign aid and is ranked as the second biggest recipient of foreign aid in the world, receiving roughly US$3.5 billion yearly from donors—

representing approximately 60 percent the country's budget.[52] All 26 members of the development assistance group (DGA)[53] are partnering with Ethiopia along with emerging donors such as China and Brazil. [54]

In the past, if foreign aid helped in promoting developmental states in East Asia,[55] the experience of Ethiopia demonstrates that despite the huge amount of aid provided by foreign donors, there are some factors which impede the emergence of an Ethiopian developmental democratic state. The government of Ethiopia prioritizes reducing poverty and establishing hegemony that can ensure the survival and longevity of the current repressive regime with no incentive of building democratic institutions. Another factor is the divergent policies and intervention strategies of the donors. For instance, China prioritizes trade and investment with a strong support for a poverty reduction strategy. This aligns with both its policy of no interference and its own experience of achieving food security and enduring the communist regime. In contrast, the Western model of aid in Ethiopia has been the one in which donors have pragmatically focused on reducing poverty and fighting terrorism over reducing oppression.[56] By way of illustration, to preserve the cooperation with African countries for the anti-terrorism campaign, the United States has remained indifferent towards violations of human rights and undemocratic tendencies perpetrated by its partners in the region, including Ethiopia, Kenya, Djibouti. and Uganda.[57]

Policy Recommendations

The existing system is secured and preserved by the combination of the three inertias described by Ohno.[58] Uprooting these inertias within the current Ethiopian scenario necessitate many strategic changes in the following three main areas: democratic developmentalism, ADLI, and foreign aid.

Democratic Developmentalism

The process of building a democratic developmental state in Ethiopia can be successfully achieved after suppressing the obstacles, many of which are related to the constitution. The constitution should be amended in order to design, adopt, and implement the separation of powers with the system of "checks and balances," preserve a full independence of the judiciary, prevent the formation of ethnic-based political parties, simultaneously protect the minority's rights and consolidate the nation-building process, and unify Ethiopia around a political system which is non-ethnic-based, pluralist, and democratic. The constitutional amendments should also subordinate the ethnic or nationality's rights to the individual rights, including all attributes of citizenship. The legal system in Ethiopia needs to be enforced and protected against political intervention. In this regard anti-corruption agencies have to be created, strengthened, and protected firmly from political influence.

The commitment of the leaderships has to develop a responsiveness and attentiveness to all aspects of the country's democratic development dimensions. Another important strategy for the current ruling elites is to start their transformation by power-sharing with all sectors of society, especially with the political opponents, thus contributing to establish a grand national political coalition, build trust, and suppress the practice of excluding some elites for their political position or ethnic origin. That will consequently result in the formation of local political alliance favoring the developmental regime and permitting the government to implement more programs and conduct many developmental policies. As a result, such a political alliance with the

domestic groups will lead to a dominant coalition democracy,[59] which will allow the ruling party to secure the victory at every election with a scenario similar to the political regime in Japan under the rule of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP).[60]

Due to the strong correlation linking democratization to development, the country should build the required socio-economic institutions that enhance the participation of the citizens into the process of economic development. The best economic option for Ethiopia is the market economy with the state playing a crucial role in directing, planning, and monitoring the economic process whereas the private sector will also be allowed to mushroom and operate freely. The leaders should design and implement strategic programs that create an economic nationalism. The leaders should also design policies for economic diversification by focusing on targeted industries thought to contribute to the growth acceleration. The policies should also be arranged in creating a force to attract foreign technology to be transferred into the country's economy.

The government must strengthen the capability of the bureaucracy and create an environment where the bureaucrats operate with impartiality and political neutrality. The meritocracy in recruitment and nomination to various positions must be the main strategy in staffing the bureaucracy in contrast of the ethnic or political affiliation. In this regards, the leaders need to be flexible and adapt the system to the liberal democratic framework underlined in the constitution, which would contribute to the viability, the stability, and the sustainability of the state. More importantly, establishing a system of balance in power sharing among the ethnic groups would contribute to the success of the ethnic federalism. In addition, due the presence of many co-ethnics in the neighboring countries, there is a need of establishing and maintaining healthy relations with these countries.
Equally significant is the construction of a strong nation-state by adopting an ethnic-free civic nationalism to replace the current nationalism and politics solely based upon ethnic identity. For instance, at the onset of their development endeavors countries such as China, Ireland, Israel, South Korea, and Taiwan employed the nationalist zeal of "catching-up with the West" to allow a mobilization of the population for the emergence of the developmental state.[61]

In addition, the relationship state–society also has a crucial role in the debate on the developmental state. The state itself has to be considered as an entity that should be impermeably cohesive and protected from apprehension by whatsoever interests in the society. Therefore, the current elites should work towards building such a sort of relationship between the state and Ethiopian society as recommended by Trouillott.[62]

The ideological foundation of the state has to be developmental, which should consist of the design and articulation of a vision towards national development. While it has to inspire, motivate, and challenge, it should include a precise description of the development objectives along with the details about the targets, time, and costs of the projects that needs to be implemented. To allow the involvement and the appropriation of the projects by the main sectors of the state, the design of the vision should consider the inclusion and participatory approaches. [63]

In order to uproot the profound rooted bureaucratic insolation issues, the government needs to build and strengthen an efficient and professional public bureaucracy by creating an environment politically neutral, where

the functionaries and technocrats can operate freely and impartially. This should pave the way for the principle proposed by Chalmers Johnson in his own words: "the politicians reign and the state bureaucrats rule."[64] One way to achieve that is to inverse the recruitment system. The promotion and recruitment based upon meritocratic values should prevail over the application of the ethnic connectivity system and the political cronyism prevalent within governmental policy. In this regard, raising the standards of education remains one prerequisite for forming human capital and building a competent bureaucracy needed to form and sustain the Ethiopian democratic developmental state.

Instead of relying on foreign aid for funding development, the state should devise a sound strategy for generating financial resources required for funding the development projects, mainly the provision of public goods. Substantial financial resources can be generated from the taxes collected from certain activities, such as business, income, and property. Investment in any revenue generating activities and commercializing industrial goods can also be beneficial sources of financial resources. In the absence of the resource curse,[65] the natural resources are substantial sources of revenues. Encouraging domestic savings can also spur financial market growth resulting in revenue creation.[66]

In the social realm, many social policies should be implemented, such as policies focusing on poverty reduction, inequality and unemployment reduction, basic services provision, and so forth. Educational policies should be adopted with a civic education component that extols "Ethiopia," promotes national integration, develops the national consciousness, unites the fragmented socio-ethnic structure ,and promotes the sense of belonging to a historical community.

Agriculture development-led industrialization

Structural transformation of the economy requires shifting from a mono-crop-based economy along with the entire dependence on one unique raw material as the economy's lifeblood towards an industrial-based economy.

The state should adopt new orientations to become autonomous and committed to enormously invest in the agricultural sector and makes it as a national project. An agrarian reform should be conducted in combination of fair policies necessary to protect the right to adequate food in accordance with the declaration made by the World Forum in regard to Food Sovereignty.[67] The priority of food sovereignty is to implement agrarian reform that can provide to all peasants identical opportunities to access land and other agricultural resources.

One major policy is the promotion of agricultural extension services by deploying extension workers (development agents) in every rural areas of the country. The policy will support knowledge and skills transfer to smallholder farmers. Another policy should focus on the promotion of agricultural research in the field of food science, socioeconomic, post-harvest technology, farm implements, breed and forage improvement, land and forestry management, biotechnological innovations, and fisheries.

The legal environment should be improved to encourage private entrepreneurship and attract foreign investors. A strong export-led and foreign direct investment-led industrialization policy should be designed. The promotion of the commercialization of agricultural products should be fostered with the aim to expand small businesses.

Foreign aid

The international aid provided to Ethiopia by its current partners encompasses motivations and practices that may either diminish the effect of aid on building effective democratic developmental regime or pose obstacles for their promotion. The donors need to create a united front for structural transformation by linking economic aid to a pro-poor and pro-democratic political system. This can be successful achieved by executing two sequences of measures.

Firstly, the money and technical assistance need to be leveraged to propel for a planned and firm disintegration of the party-state. This can be achieved by using time-bound political triggers that are focused on internationally recognized governance standards and by considering international treaties to which the government of Ethiopia has acceded. Secondly, if this aborts, then the donors will have to reduce aid gradually to the level required for humanitarian assistance. This course of action was even requested by the jailed journalist Eskinder Nega.[68]

For the success of these actions, all donors need to tackle the engagement paradox and involve in triangular development cooperation with Ethiopia. Such a triadic cooperation will combine the comparative advantages of both traditional donors (i.e., US, E.U, Australia, etc.) and the emerging donors (Brazil, Russia, India, and China). Furthermore, it will provide a great opportunity to understand and learn the policies and practices of aid delivery of one another. Since the state is not powerful enough, such cooperation will not only improve aid effectiveness as stated in the Paris Declaration,[69] but also help to construct a strong, efficient, and good governed state in Ethiopia. The partners may engage in areas as many as the science diplomacy field, the agriculture and food security sector, the sustainable management of the natural resources, the security sector, and so forth. The role of trilateral cooperation should be incorporated in planning the sorts of programs designed to reverse the vicious cycle of brain drain, thus contribute to maintaining the skilled professionals to build a professional bureaucracy for the sustainability of the democratic developmental state.
The realization of such cooperation will be a veritable litmus test of supporting the social, economic, and political development that China, Western donors, and Ethiopian government have prescribed in their different policies as well as the prerequisites towards fulfilling the "Agenda 2063" by all African countries.

Conclusion

The main question addressed in this study was the investigation of the Ethiopian regime in regard to the building of the democratic developmental and the agricultural development-led industrialization approach adopted by the regime in the 1990s. The social, economic, and political development outcomes achieved are identified by means of assessing all the indicators as presented in the previous section.

Although the regime is credited for the economic growth and development of the public services, many indicators of the democratic developmental state are below the threshold. The outcomes identified through the assessment demonstrate that Ethiopia is jailed by the social and political disasters characterized by social injustice and the rule by law rather than the role of law. The use of exclusion practices in place of coalition and integration signifies that the elites lack a commitment and a development-oriented vision with the prevalence of rent-seeking and greedy attitudes.

From the above analysis, the government has failed to implement institutional system and policies tools that can convince the majority of the Ethiopian around the developmentalism, to promote resource saving, to implement meritocratic service system, and encourage inclusion, which can positively build embeddedness. In the case of the authoritarian developmental states in Southeast Asia, the political leaders were committed to implement development strategies, uproot traditional elites and restrict greediness, combat corruption and rent-seeking.[70]

The findings of this study are also clear evidence that both traditional and emerging donors are blindly supporting the corrupt and undemocratic regime in Ethiopia. The actual scenario existing in Ethiopia does not correspond either to a democratic nor developmental features. In this regard, the view of the ruling party's elite (Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front) for their commitment to build a developmental state remains a utopia. In my opinion, Ethiopia should be considered as at the early stage of a developmental state.

In this regard, the above-mentioned policy recommendations would help to transform the current government into democratic government and help to establish the Ethiopian democratic developmentalism, which remains a veritable litmus experiment to achieve the objective of middle income by 2030 and the African Union Agenda of the democratic developmental state in the continent by 2063. However, the implementation of these recommendations may encounter some obstacles that need to be addressed by conducting further studies. The regime has been in place for more than two decades and the foreign aid policies are specific for each donor and extremely complicated. Steps allowing the transformation of the issues underlying the attitude and perceptions of all the actors (Government of Ethiopia and development partners) and leading to the ripeness towards changes remain a relevant area of research.

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How to Foster Open Dialogue between Cuba and the United States: The Usage of Educational and Sports Visas to Bridge the Strait

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Abstract

The relationship between Cuba and the United States plays a role in the day-to-day reports of the news media industry. This coverage has created an environment that could be beneficial for further political and economic integration between the two nations, as it has been thrust on to the world stage. In the case of these two nations there are multiple strategies that can be used to continue the process for Cuba and the United States to take steps to further integration; steps that can adapt and change polices between the two nations in order to develop positive communication and economic growth. Increased study of the history of the strained relationship between these two nations can be used as a base to develop a political and economic integration plan to strengthen a possibly budding partnership. This integration plan needs to have multiple facets in order to target different areas of concern. The paper that follows contains a plan to increase the exchanging of information through sports and educational visas. By focusing on these concepts, possible discussions can be born from these exchanges and drive change through a people to people perspective.

Biography

Rebecca Bruckenstein is a recent graduate from the University of Bridgeport with a master's degree in Global Development and Peace. She is passionate about creating innovative solutions for some of the world's biggest challenges. She truly believes in the power of diversity and education as a tool for development. In the Global Development and Peace program she has had the opportunity to write about nations across the globe from South East Asia to South America; due to this she has been able to research a broad range of topics that impact a large amount of the global population. Through this program she had the opportunity to study abroad in Japan, where she was able to continue her Japanese study as well as experience a culture very different from the one found in the United States. Rebecca also has an undergraduate degree in Journalism and Drama Studies from SUNY Purchase College in New York. She looks forward to what the future has in store and hopes to continue researching and traveling through countries around the globe.

Introduction

The relationship between the United States and Cuba began around the late 1800s. This relationship between the two has shifted from partnership to silence due to embargo to the beginnings of possible partnership again. The United States continually has played a role in the political atmosphere in Cuba from the late 1800s until Fidel Castro's rise to power in the 1960s. Once Castro rose to power in 1959, the United States enacted a trade embargo as well as other policies that have affected the relationship between the two nations, resulting in limited communication.[1] This embargo and limited political exchanges were originally due to Cuba's shift to communism and their growing relationship with the Soviet Union during the 1960s. In 1961, Castro announced that Cuba was a Communist state, despite a dialogue held in the late 1950s between then Vice President Richard Nixon and Castro, which was an attempt by the United States to align Castro and Cuba with the United States.[2] This time period would be influential because of the seemingly lasting impact this had on their relationship and how it would ultimately limit the dialogue between the two nations.

A defining moment in the relationship between these two countries was the Cuban Missile Crisis. This crisis led to a fear that a nuclear war would be imminent between the United States and the Soviet Union, which theoretically could have had a global impact due to the possible usage of nuclear weapons. Ultimately, the missiles in Cuba would be removed but this did not alter the relationship between the United States and Cuba. Two other factors that have impacted the relationship between the two nations are the flow of people between the two nations, as well as the supposed creation of biological weapons, which lead to Cuba being placed on the terrorism watch list in 2002. This shows the impact one event or a series of events can have over time on the relationship between two nations.[3]

This paper seeks to understand how to improve the political and economic bonds between Cuba and the United States in order to help develop a more stable relationship between the two nations. As above mentioned, these nations are at a crossroad in their relationship. The main actors in this dialogue are the governments of both Cuba and the United States, the people of both nations, and the Cuban diaspora worldwide, but mainly in the United States. While the diaspora could be considered a spoiler in this process, the opinions of all of these parties have been shifting. Due to this shift it is important to make sure that the diaspora feels invested in this relationship-building process. This includes having the diaspora as part of the dialogue on how best to relate to the shifting alliance and discussing what roles they can take on in this process. An early step to repairing communication and trust could be pressing for open travel between the two countries, which would increase the need for visas and would create a base for academic and monetary exchanges. Many academics believe that the exchange of ideas is an important step in relationship-building techniques, meaning that opening the shores would allow for more unity between these populations.

Cuba and the Region

In order to understand how to more efficiently improve relations between the United States and Cuba it is important to understand the roles that Cuba and the United States play in the region. The United States has played an active role towards advancing reforms that support a more open relationship and in some ways it has stood in the way of allowing the advancements of Cuba in regional organizations. In her article "The Special Case of Cuba," Lana Wylie discusses not only the role of the United States and its re-

gional neighbors but the relationship that Cuba holds with Canada, specifically exploring the question of whether or not Canada should play a role in trying to improve the relationship between the United States and Cuba. Wylie's article also examines the importance of the role of Cuba in the region and the global perspectives of the nation.[4] In order to create an environment of shared interests on a more regional level it is important for the United States to understand and try to develop these regional relationships further in order to create multiple open channels for both political and economic discourse that can increase regional cooperation more broadly then the efforts being described in-depth within this paper.

While the United States has historically placed heavy restrictions on Cuba and has tried to keep them out of regional trade and political organizations, this has not been the case in regards to the United States allowing Cuba to join organizations such as the United Nations. Some of the United States opposition of Cuba being included in these groups stems from Cuba not being a democracy and the Cold War relationship between Cuba and the Soviet Union. In 2009, the Organization of American States (OAS) lifted a 47-year suspension of Cuba's membership to the group, which made some government officials of the United States angry, causing backlash within the states towards the Organization of American States even though Cuba chose not to return to the group at this time.[5] Cuba has played a role in furthering relationships with its neighbors by creating and joining regional organizations, which shows that even without being a part of the OAS, Cuba is able to gain support and have economic backing outside of that group. "Cuba's international reputation is evident in the support it receives in international institutions. For the twentieth consecutive year, in 2011, the UN voted to condemn the US embargo of Cuba. In 2011, 186 countries sided with Cuba while only two countries voted with the United States. In 2009 Cuba was re-elected as a member of the United Nations Human Rights Council, largely because of the support it received from other states in the region."[6] This demonstrates the role and power Cuba holds in the region, even up against the supposed power of the United States on this topic. This is one of the reasons why it is so important that the United States begins to adapt its strategies and relationship in regards to Cuba. By laying the groundwork for this relationship we can as previously mentioned change the face of the region.

Cuba and the United States

The relationship between the United States and Cuba has been created through a strengthening and weakening of ties, policies, governmental beliefs, and power structures and events that have created the relationship that we experience today. This relationship is the base of much academic scholarship on the small island nation of Cuba. In this way, the relationships between these two nations are studied through multiple perspectives, which could yield different conclusions in regards to the relationship, as well as varying opinions on ways to lay possible foundations for change between the two. In recent history, the discussion between the governments of these two nations has expanded and this relationship has begun to change and adapt with the changing times and opinions. It is certainly not a perfect process as there seems to be a one step forward, one step back process, but this could be the optimal time in creating change that can be impactful in both political and economic integration in a way that is mutually beneficial for both nations.

In a way, it is possible to approach the relationship between Cuba and the United States

from multiple perspectives. These perspectives include viewpoints from people such as members of the Cuban Diaspora, governmental officials both on the international and local circuits, scholars, athletes, and global everyday citizens as just a few categories to which people both are grouped and group themselves, as well as the way in which central viewpoints could be formed and understood. By understanding this topic through these multiple lenses, it could impact the ways in which the two nations can begin to come together to form a supportive version of political and economic integration. The authors of the articles used in this case study tend to analyze a specific subsection of the population interested in and apart of the relationship between the two nations. Each article stresses the impact that this relationship has on those populations and some of the articles take it one step further to discuss the impact a stable relationship could have, both on the two nations as well as its possible impact on the populations they study. These articles cover such topics as the embargos effect on baseball players, the development of infrastructure in Cuba as a possible way for building democracy, relationships between the diaspora populations and their home nation of Cuba, possible reforms to the communist state, Cuba's relationship with its neighbors and Canada, and the ways in which the government of the United States could play a role in improving the relationship with Cuba. While these articles differ on approaches and even vary slightly by topic, they all examine this relationship in such a way that conclusions can be drawn to support possible tools that can be used on the path of political and economic integration. Each article contributes insight that is valuable in helping to formulate an approach and channel by which change could be possible, as well each article plays a role in developing a deeper insight to the relationship and region which is integral in being able to formulate the briefly described abovementioned steps to integration.

The history of the relationship between the two nations is an important part of the discussion; especially how it relates to the embargo, which is both a part of the history as well as a result of that history. A strong example of this discussion can be found in "The Normalization of US-Cuba Relations: The Easing of the Embargo and the Role of International Law" written for a presentation at the Universita Roma in February of 2015 by Nigel D. White.[7] This presentation deeply explores the complex relationship between the two nations.

The starting point, in understanding the relevance of international law, is to clarify the historical and political contexts within which the bilateral relations of Cuba and the US have been shaped. That history is a struggle about sovereignty, independence, intervention and non-intervention, self-determination and human rights, so basically it is a struggle over international law—it's content, meaning and application.[8]

This shows that a relationship between two nations can play a role both in their bilateral relationships as well as on a global level, through international law. White tries to document the effects the embargo has had on Cuban citizens and what that means in relation to the formation of a relationship between the United States and Cuba. The relationship between these two nations also is formed by the role of the USSR in the region of Cuba up until the early 1990s; with the fall of the Soviet Union and the weakening of its role in the region, Cuba became a weaker nation with its citizens becoming the victims of this relationship's decline. This situation has somewhat been on the path to renewal even with lag in the Cuba-US relationship. "That demonstrates, in my opinion, sufficient intent and cause to constitute the deliberate

damage to Cuba and to its people over and beyond the US simply exercising its rights to choose trade partners."[9] This leads to further discussion on what on an international level is an appropriate response to a nation that disagrees with the political leadership of another nation.

White argues that there has been a step towards a return to a more open relationship, as diplomatic relations and ties have steadily increased between the two nations and even, to some extent, the beginnings of more open travel between the two nations.[10] He does state that this type of relationship building will not occur overnight and that it might take many years to build up a relationship that could be considered a durable or stable peace level relationship in relation to Lund's Curve of Conflict. White attributes the shift in part due to both President Obama being in his last term and a shifting of the political landscapes throughout Latin America. The biggest roadblock to Cuban and US relations could be said to be the Helms-Burton act and the Castro family remaining as the heads of state; the role of international law from this perspective is that it plays a role in the shaping of each nation's opinion and policy on the other. Even if it's not followed, it does shape and define the relationship.[11] One item discussed in this article that could be seen as creating a step towards a supportive political and economic integration policy from White's perspective is the possible creation of a tribunal in order for victims of both sides to receive a settlement, or perhaps a fund that could support them laid out with leaders from both nations involved in the process. From the perspective of this paper, an open dialogue is an important part of continuing the steps towards further political and economic integration in the region.

Another way to view the relationship between the two nations is through a specific population that both shapes and is affected by this uneasy relationship. The two specific populations that are covered in this way are Cuban athletes and the Cuban diaspora. These views are covered in two articles on the subject: "Cuban Baseball Players, The Unlucky Ones: United States-Cuban Professional Baseball Relations Should be an Integral Part of the United States-Cuba Relationship," written by Rachel Solomon,[12] and "The Declining Symbolic Significance of the Embargo for South Florida's Cuban Americans," written by Chris Girard, Guillermo J. Grenier, and Hugh Gladwin.[13] Solomon's article covers the role that the embargo plays in major league baseball and the acquisition of Cuban players; while Girard, Grenier, and Gladwin explore the role the relationship between the two nations has affected in terms of the diaspora populations in Florida as well as their view on the purpose and power of the embargo. Both of these articles link back to the history of these two relationships as it shows the importance of the effects of these cross-national relationships on these populations.

Cuban baseball players are affected deeply by the lack of communication and by holes in the relationship between the two nations; Major League Baseball (MLB), for example, requires that they must give up their ties to their home country of Cuba. Solomon's article views the history of the Cuba-US relations through the lens of baseball; at its core, both nations view this sport as an important national pastime. The love of baseball in both nations began around the mid to late 1800s. "Prior to the establishment of the present Cuban government, baseball was a common interest for the United States and Cuba, helping to bind the two countries together."[14] Like the diaspora population, these athletes face hardship if they so choose to come to the United States in order to play baseball. Such hardships include traveling by sea to

human smuggling, all of which play a role in the relationship between these two nations. As the embargo has placed heavy restrictions on the flow of trade and ideas, it impacts all facets of life for Cuban citizens including the playing of sports. Solomon's article explains that the base of the embargo is in a policy created in 1917 under the name of the Trading with the Enemy Act; this bans any exchange with a nation that the United States is at war with. This was expanded in 1933 to mean any nation that the United States determines where a national emergency may exist.[15] The way in which Solomon structures her article gives a deeper understanding of both the history of the relationship of these two countries as well as the hardships that are faced by Cuban athletes, but especially in regards to the challenges faced by Cuban baseball players who one day hope to play MLB baseball.[16] Further development and understanding of how baseball could be used not only as an indicator of Cuba-United States relations but as a tool for developing a pathway to integration will be discussed in a subsequent chapter in this article.

The role of the diaspora population in the relationship between the two nations is an integral part of creating policy or possible steps as they have a deep connection with both nations. The article by Girard, Grenier, and Gladwin analyzes data collected by multiple studies, which are focused on the way the diaspora feels towards Cuba and their support towards an embargo on the nation.[17] The embargo can be documented as one of the ways in which the relationship between Cuba and the United States can be studied and analysed; this is because it impacts both Cuban citizens in the region as well as US citizens and the Cuban diaspora. "The latest survey in a series extending from 1991 to 2008 shows for the first time that the US trade embargo no longer enjoys majority support among South Florida's Cuban Americans."[18] This shows that by studying the diaspora population in order to understand their opinions we are grasping yet another type of history of both the diaspora and that of the embargo, which as previously mentioned is one of the core parts of the US-Cuba relationship. In this quantitative study the authors are looking at nine dependent variables in order to understand what they call "exile ideology." These dependents in some way are all related to either the historical or more modern approach to this relationship, such as determining how the respondents feel about travel to Cuba, Cuban musicians playing in the United States, open dialogue between the two nations, as well as companies selling medicine to Cuba, or the United States providing food to the nation are some of the factors that determine how the diaspora views the world they live in and the life they may have left behind. This all links to the understanding of how the relationship can effect, on a very local level, the diaspora population in the United States. While it seems that this study expresses a drop in support, it doesn't mean that there is not support towards the embargo within this community and beyond in the United States.[19] Both Democrats and Republicans who are Cuban Americans and still support an embargo and restrictions on the island are counter balancing what the president has attempted to do, such as lifting some of the travel bans.[20] It is important that while examining the broad relationship between the governments of the two nations that the localized, small interpersonal relationships are examined in order to be able to create policies that take these different levels into account. As steps are made in improving relations it is important that the diaspora are included in the process, as this group can be one of the spoilers on the path to political and economic integration.

Another way in which the literature can study the relationship between Cuba and the United States is through policy implementation and through the ability and opportunity to access information or tools to gather information such as the internet. In "A Cuban Spring? The Use of the Internet as a Tool of Democracy Promotion by United States Agency for International Development in Cuba," Pamina Firchow provides a current understanding and history of the availability of the internet in the region.[21] Access to the internet is yet another lens by which we could study the United States' role in Cuba. In Cuba, access to the internet is limited and under careful watch by the government. "One such policy is the integration of Internet technologies and the provision of materials by development actors such as the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) as part of their democracy promotion programs in developing countries. Although in many instances these programs are welcomed by recipient governments, the question becomes more difficult when dealing with those authoritarian regimes that are not open to the unregulated proliferation of the Internet in their societies."[22] This is the case as described in Cuba where even though there is some infrastructure for the internet it is not readily available; the citizens of Cuba do have access to the Intranet, which gives them access to limited information that the government has already sanctioned as appropriate. Even with this limited access, the people of Cuba have tried to attempt to speak out through various mediums such as blogging when possible and the passing around of a flash drive to pass along information.[23]
Internet and media have been used as a democracy building tool between the two nations as well:

"Democracy promotion through ICTs has been a part of the US-Cuba relations since the Cuban Revolution with clandestine radio broadcasting and the US-sponsored Radio Marti broadcasting politically oriented programming since 1985…In particular the CDA promoted telecommunications services, which were previously prohibited by the embargo."[24]

The concept of free speech is extremely important in United States culture and it is embedded in much of the nation-building they conduct across the world. While unsuccessfully trying to spread the word of democracy building in the 1980s, free speech is constantly being reimagined to try to reform the nation. The USAID plays a big role in this process in Cuba. In 2011, a USAID contractor named Alan Gross was found guilty of entering Cuba on a tourist visa and bringing to the nation devices that can link, and can assist in linking, Cuban citizens into the internet. While much of what he brought onto the island was legal, there were some items which were not and the way in which they were brought in led to Gross's arrest. The lack of internet on the island as documented in Firchow's work shows that it can be used to support the argument of both sides as Cuba says that access to the internet can create equality issues and the United States siding with the importance of freedom of speech and democracy building.[25] This shows that the United States-Cuba relations on the issue of access to information is very strained and is one of the challenges that is faced when trying to figure out a way to create pathways towards economic and political integration. "Although democracy promotion may be a part of USAID's mandate, in the case of Cuba, this is obviously not appropriate."[26] By studying the relationship through the lens of access to the internet we can see some of the defining differences between the two nations and ways in which creating policy must be handled in order to bring about even the

smallest step toward integration.

It is important to understand the relationships between any nations from multiple perspectives. In each piece of literature on the topic of the United States and Cuba relationship, a different perspective is provided through multiple lenses in order to best understand a very complex relationship. In order to create a change that could be sustainable it is important to understand there are multiple primary and secondary actors that all must be included if political and economic integration is to take place. This goes beyond just conflict resolution but rather moves into conflict transformation where the two parties can be on the path to working together on different projects on multiple levels. Understanding the past and current situations is important in formulating a plan for the future. The relationship between the United States and Cuba is currently constantly in flux as the United States government is trying to forge a road to integration between the two nations. It is important to mention that none of the articles that are presented are from the Cuban perspective as most of the articles are written in the United States or the western world. As this paper is being written the relationship is changing and adapting everyday, which is creating more information for further academic research on the topic. By being able to analyze the above articles it provides the ability to determine what a possible path to integration could be acceptable to both nations.

The Complexities of Baseball and United States-Cuba Relations

Baseball is known for being the official pastime of the United States, but it has also played a role in the relationship between the United States and Cuba. As mentioned previously, baseball became popular in the United States around the mid to late 1800s and became popular in Cuba a short time later. Between the latter part of the 1800s and 1959, when the Cuban Revolution occurred, the exchange of baseball players was possible with both Americans and Cubans playing on each nation's teams. This exchange ended because Cuba started putting Communist reforms into place and aligning themselves closer to the Soviet Union during and after the Cold War. Due to a rise in tensions between the two nations, restrictions such as the embargo were put in place. These restrictions were placed in an attempt to weaken the Castro regime but ultimately, as of 2015, the regime is still in power. Since these restrictions have been put into place, some Cuban citizens have left hoping for a better life in the United States, which is approximately 90 miles from the Cuban coast. Included in this group of people seeking opportunities beyond Cuban shores are athletes. Castro had laid out a similar style system to that of the Soviet Union, whereby sports are important not only to physical health but to the power of nation building. Salaries are low but the calling of the ability to make money for available skills has enticed some to attempt this path to a better life. For some Cuban baseball players this seems like the best path possible to be successful but a slew of regulations stand in their way on the path to being able to play for the MLB. By examining these regulations and by analyzing the role they play in the lives of athletes, it could be possible to foster a dialogue about possible ways to create integration between athletes in both nations; this step can as well lead to even more possibilities for economic and political integration.[27]

As above stated, there are multiple restrictions for Cuban baseball players who wish to play baseball in the United States. These restrictions can be complex and especially challenging for Cuban players to navi-

gate because players are forced to give up their Cuban citizenship and because of a MLB rule that was created in 1977 by Commissioner Bowie Kuhn, which became known as the "Kuhn Directive," which bans any dealings with baseball players in Cuba, from recruiting, scouting, and signing. Whereas players from other countries have the ability to be signed in their home country,Cubans are forced to move elsewhere and assume residency if they wish to play baseball in the United States. The other way that players can currently play in the MLB is by coming to the United States straight from Cuba and by joining what is known as the amateur draft. Like the diaspora population, defecting baseball players face similar hardships coming to the United States, such as being smuggled across the 90 mile strait into Florida. [28] Solomon's article discusses some proposals that have previously been made in order to help the situation of the Cuban baseball players, which ultimately can have lasting impacts in both nations. She talks about two possible strategies, one of which is known as the "Baseball Diplomacy Act," which was created around 1995 but has yet to be enacted. This law would allow baseball players to come to the United States on a work visa to play baseball. This visa would allow the players the ability to keep their Cuban citizenship, bring their salaries back to Cuba, and stay in the country a certain amount of time; however, this law has yet to be passed due to being blocked by the United States Congress. There has also been some lobbying movement towards a worldwide baseball draft. This would not directly affect Cuban players because as long as there are heavy restrictions it would not change their situation. The article also discusses the benefits that would occur if these restrictions were lifted.[29] These benefits are expanded in the discussion below on ways that baseball can be beneficial as a tool for integration between the two countries.

Access to Educational Visas

Education is a strong tool that can be used to help individuals grow in both their social status and culture as well as be a tool to change a nation. Education can also be used to help formulate strong bonds and friendships between nations. In regards to Cuba, there have been periods of influx of Cuban and American academic exchanges, but it is hard to pinpoint a steady pattern beyond who is in political office in the United States and what their relationship is to Cuba at the current time. Educational tools and visas are looked at in "U.S.-Cuba Academic and Science-Based Exchanges: Prospects for a Two-Way Street" by Stephen Johnson, Nicholas R. Lombardo, and Sadie May Davis. It also provides readers with some helpful hints on how best to move forward if you wish to host academic conferences or to travel for educational purposes to Cuba, as well as some historical context to these endeavors.[30]

In a way this article is another lens by which to gain insight into the United States-Cuba relationship. "For foreign participants, exchanges in the United States offer an atmosphere to think and speak freely as well as a lens through which to see the United States in a positive light."[31] This demonstrates what was discussed in the article concerning the USAID's idea of democracy building in nations like Cuba, which is that democracy building is a large part of the United States interests in involvement with other nations.[32] The usage of academic exchanges is not new to these two nations as they have been partners in these types of dialogue from the beginning of the United States-Cuba relationship in a broad sense until today, even in its limited state. The article discusses some of the partnerships that have occurred over time.

They are able to explain to us the importance of location choice when selecting where the event will be held. The article explains three primary locations for such educational events. Events within the United States, have the ability to expose Cubans to democracy and freedoms they cannot access in Cuba the main pitfall being that access to the United States by Cuban citizens is limited based on various factors. If the event is held in Cuba, United States citizens could possibly attend but freedom of speech and ideas are extremely limited. This leaves the option for a neutral third country, but removing the discussions from the countries in question makes instilling values of either nation extraordinarily more difficult.[33] This demonstrates that location ultimately plays a large role in possible outcomes for the event. At times, there is also an increase in students and professors being able to teach in either country but for very specific purposes.

Another roadblock to academic exchanges is the actual access to visas for both Americans and Cubans. Both have to apply for a visa and the category of travel that they are applying for impacts the ability to receive a visa. In the United States there are restrictions on reasons for travel for citizens to Cuba and an application that must be filled out in advance of travel. All documents must be held onto for five years by both the traveler and airline if they fly down to Cuba. In this way, there are two designations of visas known as "general licenses" and "specific licenses." "General licenses" are the most typically used type being that it contains approximately 12 different designations such as government official, humanitarian aid worker, journalist, or student just to label a few. In respect to Cuban regulations the biggest complication is that Cuba can deny visas for various reasons, especially if they believe that the citizen may not return to Cuba after being abroad and that the costs of the passports and visas are extremely high for the common person's income, even more so if it is determined that an interview is needed before being presented with a visa. It is important to keep in mind the selection process for who you invite to join your academic conference, as it is often government or ranking officials that are able to attend and that if additional people should be invited it is important to allow that process to be handled by someone or a respected organization on the ground so as to not alienate or put any person you may have wanted to invite in danger.[34] Due to these concerns it's extremely important that planning is done in advance over a longer period of time then often necessary for other countries. Johnson et al.'s article provides us with some background understanding of the importance of educational conferences and the best practices for such affairs.[35]

Integration through Baseball

Baseball, as mentioned previously, is America's pastime and one can argue it has as well become a popular pastime in Cuba. It is important to acknowledge that what is proposed here is just a step in a process towards integration, since many different dialogues need to be held by these different interest groups and that policies need to be adjusted to fit the views of the people involved. The purpose of using baseball is because the players can be considered a group of people who can be beneficial to both nations. Americans love to watch the sport, see new players, and buy lots of merchandise, which benefits teams and ultimately, players. For the United States to be able to access a market of strong healthy players such as those found in Cuba, it can help to revitalize teams and the sport in general. To Cuba, this creates an even bigger interest in available players, the sport itself, ability to play in a more global setting, and if

policies were created with players in mind remittances could be sent to the nation to assist in economic projects to further develop the nation, in areas that may normally be ignored.

The "Baseball Diplomacy Act" laid out in Solomon's article seems to be the most well developed plan for this process, but due to the regime in Cuba change is slow coming from the United States government and varies from president to president. The Obama administration is making headway with their relationship to Cuba but it does not seem as if baseball is on the table as of yet. By using baseball as a tool towards integration it can be a talking point where both parties can benefit by changing the policy that is in place as of this date.[36] This can be formulated by gathering a council in regards to the MLB and the creation of new regulations for sports visas between the two nations. This council should include government officials from multiple nations, members of the MLB, current players from multiple nations such as Cuba, and even if possible some members of the diaspora population. This group can meet in Canada if meeting in the United States doesn't seem possible, as Canada has stable relations with both nations that would be the main members of this exchange. Hopefully, this council ultimately will lead to changes to the sports visa program that can be sustainable and a positive step for political and economic integration and conflict transformation for all parties involved.

Integration through Educational Visas

The term "educational visas" can be pretty broad as it can be used in discussion as visas to attend school programs, teach, or attend academic conferences. Access to visas can be a controversial topic in both the United States and Cuba, since each nation has its concerns about the accessibility of visas and travel as a two-way street. Currently there is much discussion in the United States about the increase of travel to Cuba; as of this time travel is limited to specific types of travel and is not yet completely open to tourism. The tool of educational visas can be an important way to build up an educated discourse on multiple topics, including that of visa accessibility. Educational exchanges can be impactful and a strategic tool for cultural understanding and sustainable development; on both a people to people level as well as a nation to nation level that could possibly breed an opening of dialogue that brings the two nations together and can build a strong support network for possible regional integration. Since there are some channels in place for academic travel, it is important to make sure that the progress that has been made continues to have strides towards success. As the number of participants in each nation tends to fluctuate year to year as one nation may allow and the other may decide that it is not a beneficial usage of funds and time. Due to this it is important to focus on the importance of exchanging academic ideas especially on topics where the U.S. can help to forward Cuba development wise and how the two nations can benefit from sharing ideas. It is well known that Cuba has some of the world's best healthcare and by studying medicine together it could create benefits for both nations. At this time, even though the Castro regime is still in power, it is important to plant the seed of educational friendship if the Cubans are not ready for democracy building as a tool of education. It will be best to focus on ways the two nations can work together and to avoid any sensitive topics. Within the confines of the United States it is important to focus on opening the ability for the diaspora to be a part of the educational model as they have insight on Cuba that others may not be able to share. It is also important that

educational institutions advertise programs and create interest in Latin American countries in general in order to open the eyes of students and to present them with more opportunities to study abroad. Education can be a tool for change and one that should be nurtured and supported as the nations' relationships change, in order to create an open line of communication and educated individuals who can speak expressly on the topic. As abovementioned in relation to baseball players a council of different stakeholders should be created to assist the governments in creating an education plan for the nations together to be used as a goal to reach over time. Educational visas, like the general visas, need to be more well-known and understood by interested parties and more access is essential if it will be a mode of political or economic integration.

Conclusion

The relationship between the United States and Cuba is at a crossroad, and it has become a large topic for the media and something people across the globe seem to gravitate towards as a story of a nation surviving a blockade, but there is much more to this relationship and much more to the story then what is portrayed by the media. As dialogue between the two nations opens to discuss conflict resolution that links to the embargo and other restrictions, it is important to support an effort towards conflict transformation as a way to bring about a strong supportive relationship between the two nations. By interacting with multiple populations and policies it is important that as many voices are heard as possible to make an adaptable process that meets the needs and wants of the masses. While this paper primarily focuses on baseball players and access to educational visas, it and others like it can be the opening of dialogue on the exchange of ideas. It is important to support political and economic integration in the region because Cuba is miles off Florida's shore and a policy of communication can help to support successes in both nations. Transformation will not occur overnight, but overtime step by step progress can be made to help the region become more integrated with an open dialogue, and the opening of dialogue can support changes in policy.

Endnotes

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Japan's Taiwan Problem: Taiwan as a Complicating Factor in Sino-Japanese Relations

Tobias Yasutake

Abstract

Taiwan's unique situation creates an apparently unsolvable security situation between countries that need to be partners: a situation where the best action seems to be to do nothing. Sino-Japanese relations are currently shaky at best. Disputes over territory and insults (whether real or perceived) over unresolved issues from World War II disrupt what is an essential relationship for stability in the region. Things are only complicated more by the presence of Taiwan. Historically, the issue of Taiwan has always been a vitally important playing piece between China and the United States, but Japan also seems to have a vested interest in Taiwan. This connection with Taiwan has the potential to negatively impact Sino-Japanese relations. In the event of a Taiwanese crisis, Japan's relation with China could be pushed over the edge: a situation that would not favor anyone. Therefore, there will probably be no conflict, but tensions are constantly high. This paper looks at the relations between China, Japan, and Taiwan, each to each, with an emphasis on Taiwan's potential to deteriorate Sino-Japanese relations.

Biography

Tobias Yasutake is a graduate student at the University of Bridgeport. Born in Hawaii to a German mother and a Japanese American father, he is always interested in the many different sides and perspectives of differing cultures. A writer of both fiction and non-fiction, and an enthusiast of history, culture, religion, philosophy, and game design, he is currently studying in the Master of Arts in East Asian and Pacific Rim Studies Program.

Introduction

Taiwan is a strange and unique country politically. It has been the catalyst for numerous tense moments and has been thought of and debated about a great deal. This is because it has played the role of an important and controversial issue between the United States and China. In brief, the United States is allied and supports Taiwan. China (meaning the PRC, People's Republic of China) has had issues with Taiwan ever since, during the Chinese Civil War, Chiang Kai-shek (the leader of the Republic of China: Chinese Nationalist side) was driven from the mainland and retreated onto the island of Formosa, which was renamed Taiwan. When the United States and China normalized relations in the 1970s, the issue of Taiwan created complications and was never resolved.

While technically Taiwan's only ally is the United States,[1] Taiwan has numerous positive relationships with countries around the world. One of the greatest and most important to Taiwan is Japan. However, this friendship between Taiwan and Japan, like the friendship between Taiwan and the United States, may cause trouble between Japan and China. Until recently Japan was the world's second largest economy, only behind the United States, but in 2010 China overtook Japan in terms of GDP.[2] Since then, the gap has only widened. The two counties are both economic powerhouses whose shadows are cast over the entire region. The relationship between these two 'giants' of Asia is a subject that is very important when considering economic growth in the entire region.[3] In his article *Chinese Relations with Japan,* Deng states, "Sino-Japanese relations take on an importance in Asian affairs at least comparable to that of Franco-German relations in determining European affairs."[4]

Therefore, when examining the issue of Taiwan, it is not only necessary to examine Taiwan's role in potentially disrupting the relationship between China and the United States, but also its possible disruption of Sino -Japanese relations. This paper intends to analyze the Taiwan issue and look at how it relates to the already complex situation surrounding China and Japan. Not mentioning the United States is practically impossible when discussing Taiwan' however, the focus of this paper is on the triangle of Japan, Taiwan, and China. Is Taiwan important to Japan, or is an improved Japanese relationship with Taiwan something that Japan cannot get out of that harms Japan's relationship with China?

Current Sino-Japanese Relations

Sino-Japanese relations are a complex and tense subject. Historically, China was always the dominant power in Asia, and the other nations, including Japan, paid respect to China and were deeply affected by Chinese culture. Since the start of the Century of Humiliation (a hundred year period of China being defeated starting with the opium wars in 1839 and ending with the PRC seizing control of mainland China in 1949[5]), Chinese decline and Japanese growth changed that relationship, but now China sees itself as returning to its "rightful" position. A rising China naturally worries Japan, who was the dominant power in the region for much of the century since the Meiji Reformation.[6]

Currently, Japan is having plenty of problems with China even without the "help" of Taiwan. In 2014, the BBC released their World Service Poll. The BBC found that no country hated Japan more than China, and no country hated China more than Japan.[7] Sino-Japanese relations have suffered in recent years over a number of issues. Old wounds surrounding actions done by the Japanese

sometimes flare up.

These can take the form of visits by Japanese officials to the Yasukuni Shrine honoring Japanese war heroes, including some who did wartime atrocities to Chinese,[8] or in the form of the Japanese editing school textbooks to reduce the severity of their World War II actions.[9] Another example of an issue is the dispute between China and Japan over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. The anti-Japanese sentiment grew so great over this issue that in 2012 some protestors demanded that the Chinese government go to war with Japan,[10] and Japanese businesses lost approximately $120 million in property damage due to vandalizing and looting.[11]

The post war relationship between Japan and China has not always been so terrible despite the fact that many of the problems surrounding modern Sino-Japanese relations relate to actions done during World War II. For example, after the Tiananmen Massacre in 1989, Japan was the first country to re-establish diplomatic ties with China.[12] While fears of a Chinese rise creates a lot of natural tension, and nationalistic tendencies[13] in both countries are not helping, Japan and China are trying to rebuild their relationship. The two countries are tied together very strongly economically, and this makes it in both of their interest to work together. Also, any overt action that the Chinese may make against the Japanese will upset the United States and spell bad news for practically everyone in the region.

A History of Taiwan and Current Cross-Strait Relations

Despite the fact that this paper is focusing on Japan's connection with Taiwan, it is impossible to discuss Taiwan's current history without understanding the context of both its history with mainland China and the United States. In 1949 Chiang Kai-shek and his nationalist followers fled from mainland China to Formosa, which was then renamed to Taiwan. While I refer to Taiwan, it is technically known as the Republic of China (ROC). Today, Taiwan does not actually consider itself the rightful ruler of China, but for Chiang Kai-shek's reign, the ROC considered itself the rightful government of China in exile, and the divide between the ROC and PRC to be temporary.

The Communist PRC tried to align itself with Soviet Russia during the Cold War, but after a time it began to move away from the U.S.S.R. In 1972, President Nixon shocked the world by normalizing relations with the Chinese.[14] This was the beginning of the intractable issue of Taiwan between the United States and China. In 1979, President Jimmy Carter ended U.S. recognition of Taiwan in favor of China, but the United States Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act, where the United States still protected Taiwan against Chinese attack and supplied Taiwan with weapons for its defense.[15]

The support of the United States for Taiwan could easily be considered the biggest sticking point in the relationship between the United States and China. It was an unresolved issue then and it remains so now. Despite the fact that the United States officially does not recognize Taiwan, the United States has shown that it is willing to defend it in truth and not just on paper.

The US' pivotal role was most clearly shown in 1996, when China conducted provocative missile tests to try and influence Taiwan's first direct presidential election. In response, US President Bill Clinton ordered the biggest display of US military power in Asia since the Vietnam War, sending ships to the Taiwan Strait, and a clear message to Beijing.[16]

Both sides are unwilling to back down, and yet conflict would be disastrous for both sides, and therefore the issue has remained in a strange undetermined nebulous state for over thirty five years.

Why is this such an important issue for both countries? It was surprisingly difficult to research reasons for why the United States is so adamant in its defense of Taiwan. The resources I found didn't even address the issue, and only talked about why Taiwan was so important to China,[17] and besides, a fully in-depth reason is both moot and beyond the scope of this paper. The following therefore is speculation.

There are two points of view: an optimistic one and a pessimistic one. The United States has stated over and over again that they are interested in a peaceful resolution to the Taiwan situation, and so the optimistic view is that the United States's position is good for its image as a global peacemaker. The United States is protecting democracy and freedom from the military actions of a Communist country and simply has continued to do even after becoming close to China in a post-Cold War environment. However, Taiwan does not look like it wants to peacefully rejoin China, and China views a declaration of independence on Taiwan's part as unacceptable. The pessimistic realpolitik view therefore would be that the United States is using Taiwan as a playing piece in order to suppress China's power and also as an excuse to maintain a military presence in the region. Neither of these explanations is entirely satisfactory.
The reasons why China is so adamant on the Taiwan issue is more documented and clear. Its importance is difficult to overstate. One could even say that it is the most important aspect of their most important relationship. As authors Nathan and Scobell say in their book *China's Search for Security,* "The PRC has always labeled Taiwan as its highest-priority issue in its relations with Washington. The issue has existential importance for China because control of Taiwan is essential to Chinese security. To Chinese policymakers, the crux of the "Taiwan problem" has never been Taiwan's separation from the mainland as such, but the U.S. role in perpetuating that separation."[18]

Realpolitik means looking at a situation based not on ideology or rhetoric, but rather in terms of practical and material factors. Author Thomas J. Christensen analyzes Chinese foreign policy with a realpolitik mindset, but finds that it is inadequate to explain China's emphasis on Taiwan. The Chinese seem to absolutely refuse to allow the Republic of China to change its name to the Republic of Taiwan, even though Taiwanese independence is currently de facto: only non-existent legally. Why would China "risk damage to its economy and war with the world's only superpower" just to prevent a country from changing its name? Christensen argues thusly: Preventing Taiwan's independence would be important to any Chinese regime, but it is a critical nationalist issue for the Chinese Communist Party government. The party has, by way of market reforms, all but obliterated the second of the two adjectives in its name. Almost no influential figure in Chinese government or society believes in communism anymore, and that has created a vacuum that nationalism, always a strong element in the party's legitimacy, is filling. As many analysts have noted, nationalism is the sole ideological glue that holds the People's Republic together and keeps the CCP government in power. Since the Chinese Communist Party is no longer communist, it must be even more Chinese. And…

Chinese leaders will go to extraordinary lengths to prevent Taiwan's independence in part because they fear a national breakup. Chinese analysts believe that national integri-

ty would be threatened by an uncontested declaration of Taiwanese independence, especially because of the decades of propaganda about Taiwan's unbreakable links to the motherland. They subscribe to a domestic domino theory in which the loss of one piece of sovereign territory will encourage separatists elsewhere and hurt morale among the Chinese forces who must defend national unity. Their most notable concerns are with traditionally non-Han regions such as Tibet, Xinjiang, and Inner Mongolia.[19]

So one reason that the CCP are willing to accept a de facto Taiwanese independence so long as it does not become a legal independence is because they fear that legal independence will cause their authority over other regions of mainland China to deteriorate. The step towards de jure independence is an important one, because if Taiwan becomes its own country then it can get a seat in the UN and be impossible for China to ever reclaim. The narrative that the Communist Party has stated about Taiwan makes this an essential issue. Above, Christensen very bluntly makes the point that the CCP can hardly be considered "really" Communist anymore. One of the arguments of the original CCP was that they and they alone could unite China and save it from its century of humiliation. The existence and persistence of Taiwan disrupts this narrative. Despite the fact that mainland China is vastly greater in terms of political, economic, and military capabilities, Taiwan shows that Chinese can democratize.[20]

The democratic outcomes in Taiwan are manifestations of the evolution of a distinct cultural and political identity for the inhabitants of the island. The result of the appearance of a Taiwanese identity as distinct from a mainland Chinese one was a game changer. While the cross-strait rivalry was clearly not new—Beijing and Taipei had been rival regimes since 1949—what had changed by 1995 was the nature of the rivalry. The rivalry had shifted from a contest for control of Chinese territory to a competition for control of China's identity.[21]

This makes an unequal and strange rivalry between these two countries. When China engages in trade with other countries around the world, one of the few conditions that China demands is that these foreign powers recognize that there is only one China: the PRC. China's clout is so much greater than Taiwan's that most of the countries that haven't recognized the one China are small South and Central American countries. Without Taiwan being a military threat, China has still installed 600 missiles pointed at Taiwan. Yet despite the strength that mainland China holds over Taiwan, Taiwan has the backing (if not the recognition) of the world's only superpower, and even though there is tension between the two, that somehow does not stop a large amount of economic interdependence.[22] Indeed, China is Taiwan's biggest importer, more than doubling the United States.[23]

While the two are so different in size and power, somehow they are at odds. While they are at odds, they still somehow are intertwined. The current state of affairs really has only one outcome that can satisfy everyone: maintaining the status quo. Anything else means a huge upset on everyone's part. And so Taiwan remains as it is.

Current Japanese Taiwanese Relations

Japan and Taiwan share a common ally: the United States. The United States is willing to step in for the defense of both countries if needed. This arraignment started post-World War II, strengthened during the Cold War, and remains so today. Both Japan and Taiwan have some shared needs that are addressed by their alliance with the United

States, in particular a fear of a rising China. However, Taiwan and Japan have a stronger tie than simply strategic concerns.

The relationship between Japan and Taiwan really begins with the end of the Sino-Japanese war in 1895, when Taiwan became a colony of Japan.[24] It remained a colony of Japan for fifty years. Ten years later, Korea also became a colony of Japan, but strangely there are many issues today between Korea and Japan over the old Japanese imperial colonization that are not nearly as big of a problem for Taiwan. Why Korea has serious problems with historical issues with Japan but Taiwan does not is a topic for another paper, but I offer a single point on that is relevant for this paper. There was Japanese exploitation of Taiwan during their rule, but the Japanese divided Taiwan into two groups: the privileged rich and the oppressed poor. The rich were given educational opportunities and could keep the land that they already owned, and steps were taken to make them Japanese. This made a "weak hegemony" by making those in power in Taiwan wish to become "sub-Japanese."

Attracted by the industrial modernity and 'Westernization' of Japanese culture, many Taiwanese intellectuals embraced Japanization to some degree. Yet according to the authors, "What developed under Japanese rule was not a simple relationship of oppressive subjugator and the resisting subjugated, but rather a struggle by the Taiwanese people to form a Taiwanese identity while intentionally assimilating the Japanese ideology imposed on them."[25]

An example ripple effect of this was Lee Teng-hui, Taiwanese elected President from 1988 to 2000. Lee was born under the Japanese rule in Taiwan in 1923, he was educated in Japan and speaks fluent Japanese, and under his term he was very pro-Japan and pro-Taiwanese Independence.[26] Regardless, there has been a strong pro-Japanese force inside of Taiwan despite the previous colonial relationship.

Post-World War II, Japan stood back onto its own feet and made some connections with Taiwan, who, after all, was their natural ally against a Communist China. But in 1972, "Nixon shock" racked Japan. President Richard Nixon reached out a friendly hand to the CCP without informing the Japanese that they planned to. As SOEYA writes, "The Japanese ambassador to Washington, Ushiba Nobuhiko, was informed of Nixon's announcement less than an hour before, and the Japanese Prime Minister, Sato Eisaku, is said to have learned of it only a few minutes before."[27] The Japanese strategy to cope with a dramatic change in the political situation was to become friends with China.

However, even though the Japanese recognized the PRC as the sole ruler of China, they maintained relationships of all kinds except diplomatic recognition with Taiwan.[28] This became a common strategy used by other countries including the United States. The involvement between Japan and Taiwan only increased over time, despite the change in Sino-Japanese relations. While interacting and increasing trade with China, Japan still involved itself with Taiwan until its relationship reached what could easily be termed "unofficial in name only."[29] This policy has worked well for Japanese interest. It has let Japan reap economic rewards as well as placating China, which is Japan's biggest military threat. At the same time it has kept the benefits of interacting with Taiwan.[30] These benefits are not small: Japanese trade with Taiwan increased from $27 billion from 1990 to $64 billion in 2006.[31] Once again we see that the strategy that works best is to not disrupt the status quo. If Taiwan goes one way or another, either de jure independent or else claimed

fully by China, Japan will be forced to choose between two sides, something which does not benefit it.

The reasons why Taiwan wishes to have good relations with Japan are simple (although there is the question on why their relationship did not suffer despite colonization). Given the enormous discrepancy of strength between Taiwan and China, Taiwan needs all of the friends it can get. Japan is also allied with the United States, and without Japanese cooperation, a U.S. defense of Taiwan would be much more difficult. Also, during Japanese occupation of Taiwan, the Taiwanese benefited from the advanced industrialization of Japan, letting Taiwan have the edge over China post-World War II.[32]

Why, though, is Japan interested in being allies with Taiwan? Like answering the United States' interest in Taiwan, this is a harder question to answer. Reasons include their shared history, common values (such as capitalism, democracy, and a liking for Japanese Pop), their close economic ties, their networks contacts amongst politicos of the countries despite the fact that there are no official diplomatic ties, and their shared strategic concerns.[33]

Many of these reasons merely reinforce the relationship, not cause it. They came about after close ties between Japan and Taiwan were already established, which most likely happened during colonization. However, the reason of shared strategic concerns is something that is constant. Taiwan could be seen as something that slows the rise and power of China, and if the United States and Japan support Taiwan in order to curb Chinese advance, Taiwan is going to take advantage of the situation as far as it can.

Another reason why Japan could have a strong relation with Taiwan is because of actions taken on the part of Taiwan. It is absolutely essential to Taiwan to have Japanese support, so the Taiwanese try to broker friendship with Japan, and at the same time stir conflict in Sino-Japanese relations. Not enough to destabilize everything, but enough to try and deter strong Sino-Japanese relations. The Taiwan situation is maintained with all parties winning (or at least not losing horribly) so long as it balanced properly with the status quo maintained. This is why a crisis has not happened yet: it isn't in the interests of any of the players involved. But a bad mistake could turn the Taiwan problem into a flash point.[34] The balance can be difficult and delicate, and even if it does not spill over into war, the Taiwan problem causes upsets. Lee Teng-hui, the pro-Japanese Chairman mentioned earlier, is one such example. Lee was Chairman of the KMT party (Kuomintang, also commonly called Nationalist party) of Taiwan. After the end of his term in office and during the Democratic Progressive Party's (DPP) rule, Lee asked for a visa to visit Japan, which was granted. Despite the fact that Lee's visit was not political in nature (he was visiting for medical treatments), China reacted badly. Lee's visit just so happened to coincide while Sino-Japanese relations were being tested over Japanese revisions of historical textbooks for high school, as well as a dispute over agricultural trade.[35]

But why would Japan support an unneeded action of a former head of state if it could damage the relationship with its biggest trading partner and largest potential threat? One possible reason was that it was an intentional ploy by Lee to divide China and Japan. However, that is speculation. A more solid (though not mutually exclusive) reason is because of the force of pro-Taiwanese sentiment in Japan immediately before an election. Though Lee's condition was routine and treatment could have been performed elsewhere, his application came just as the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) held intraparty elections to determine the LDP's president, and thus the country's next prime minister.

All of the candidates aggressively affirmed their support for Lee's visit and all of the major newspapers editorialized on his behalf. Eventually the Ministry of Foreign Affairs found no choice but to issue a visa on "humanitarian" grounds. Lee's putatively private and nonpolitical visit garnered saturation coverage from the Japanese news media.[36]
Another example of Taiwan's spoiling of relations with China is the Chinese "three nos." The "three nos" were "no support for two Chinas, no support for Taiwan's independence, and no support for Taiwan's representation in international organisations."[37] While the Japanese did agree to the first two, they said nothing on the third point. As PENGER writes, "Japan's refusal to bend to PRC pressure to endorse the Three Nos during the 1998 visit of Jiang Zemin to Japan can be interpreted as another instance of Taiwan succeeding in securing Japanese sympathy and support."[38]

In 2015, Lee once again visited Japan. Just like his previous visit, his mere presence put Japan into a situation where they would have to decide between their Taiwanese ties and their Chinese ties. From the article "Better Get Used to it, China: Taiwan and Japan Will Get Closer":[39] Despite applying considerable pressure on Tokyo in recent weeks, Beijing was unable to prevent the Japanese government from rolling out the red carpet for former Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui last week. And…

Ma Xiaoguang, a spokesman for the State Council's Taiwan Affairs Office, said Beijing "strongly oppose[s] any country providing a stage for 'Taiwan independence' activities, and take strong umbrage at Japan allowing Lee to visit."
Ma continued: "Lee's contemptible acts have made compatriots from both sides see more clearly the extreme harms 'Taiwan independence' forces do to the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations and the integral benefit of the Chinese nation, and will surely be scorned by compatriots from both sides. And…

Although Tokyo is unlikely to take actions that will cause serious harm to its important relationship with China, there is nevertheless a high likelihood that Japan will increase its cooperation with Taiwan and provide the necessary moral support to the DPP [Democratic Progressive Party]. Although military-to-military relations between Taiwan and Japan have been good, albeit quietly so, in recent years, they would conceivably expand under a DPP administration that, much like a large segment of the Taiwanese public, has never hidden its deep affinity toward Japan. Nor is this a recent thing. In 2008, the KMT party found victory, and many expected that the Taiwanese government would move away from Japan and closer towards China because the KMT party of that year was different from Lee Teng-hui, but it did not happen. Instead, Japan and Taiwan seemed to get even closer. For example, Japan signed agreements letting Taiwanese fishermen fish around the Senkaku islands, which is something rather remarkable considering the situation surrounding the islands.[40]

Conclusion

While it is not the only factor (or even the main factor) in disruptions in Sino-Japanese relations, Taiwan represents a problem that needs to be sensitively handled on all sides. Until the Taiwan issue is solved, there will be complexities surrounding it that will make headline news. This may be in the interest of Taiwan, as it inflates the importance of such a relatively small island to the point where policy makers in several countries, including the world's most powerful country, spend a great deal of time analyzing and considering the situation from every possible angle. How-

ever, even though Taiwan did not necessarily choose the position, it still is a dangerous game that could blow up in Taiwan's face, and the faces of everyone else involved. On ways to solve the Taiwan problem, there is no simple solution. It is a delicate knot more complex than the proverbial Gordian Knot ever could be. As stated several times throughout this paper, what seems to be the best policy is to accept Taiwan's current de facto independence while a one China policy is maintained.

For Taiwan, it is still too early to see clearly if the newly elected Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen will maintain the status quo or push for Taiwanese independence. Testing if China is bluffing is a dangerous game to play, and it seems like what there is to gain is so much less than what there is to lose, especially because the stability of cross-strait relations is important for stability in the entire region. For China, maintaining the status quo also seems to be their intent. The Chinese are nothing if not patient. Problems can all be settled in enough time. As a recent news article says:

Rushing the matter would risk pushing over the carefully balanced architecture of cross-strait relations, while punitive measures against the Taiwanese for the democratic choices they make would result in the very opposite of what Beijing has sought to accomplish over the years – to win the hearts and minds of Taiwanese by convincing them that a future with China is in their best interest.[41]

To reduce the tension in Sino-Japanese relations, Japan should always consider the impact on China in their dealings with Taiwan. The internal political situation might make this difficult at times. Another strategy might be to distance Japan from Taiwan. The danger with Japan's relation with Taiwan is increasing tensions and a split of interests in the event of a crisis. A third strategy would be to try and mediate the cros-strait relation. The official U.S. stance is interest in a peaceful resolution to the Taiwan issue, and a peaceful resolution would remove the danger of crisis and the balance of being between two opposing sides. However, I don't believe that Japan is currently in a position to do this. First they must improve their relationship with China, a prospect that looks difficult as both sides are currently becoming more and more nationalistic.

Although it is principally a danger to the relationship between China and the United States, it is still important to look at Sino-Japan relations as this will most likely define the economic growth in the region, and it is important to understand the relationships of all the countries involved in this tangled web of political entrapments. The key to the Taiwan issue on all sides is to not tip over everything and to move carefully and slowly, hoping that the complex situation does not become a crisis point in which things spiral out of control.

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Impact of Microcredit on the Poor in Sierra Leone

Oluwatosin Akegbejo-Samsons

Abstract

It is the focus of this paper to examine the meaningful impact that microcredit has had on the poor people in Sierra Leone. Microcredit relates to the provision of money in the form of small trading loans to impoverished clients and this usually happens in destitute communities and with the sole purpose of ensuring economic growth through the development of entrepreneurial activity. This is meant to reduce poverty by generating employment and empowering women. This paper discusses various scholarly contributions to the subject of microfinance and economic empowerment. The discussion captures differing views on microfinance, reconstruction after war, models of microfinance in Sierra Leone, importance of microcredit programs, and microcredit in relation to women empowerment. The paper concludes with a narrative on the significance and life changing power of microfinance.

Biography

Oluwatosin Akegbejo-Samsons is a graduate student in the University of Bridgeport's College of Public and International Affairs program in Global Development and Peace. He received his Bachelor's degree from Babcock University in Nigeria where he studied International Law and Diplomacy, serving as the Assistant General Secretary of the 2012 graduating class. At the University of Bridgeport, he is member of the Model United Nations Club as well as the Pi Sigma Alpha and Sigma Iota Rho honor societies, and works as a library assistant at Wahlstrom Library and intern at the International Institute of Connecticut.

Introduction

Poverty and the inequitable distribution of wealth and material resources have always plagued the world through the centuries. According to the World Bank, 1.4 billion people are in extreme poverty around the world based on 2005 purchasing power parity, and this is close to 25.2% of the world populace. Nevertheless, the intense poverty (based on $1.25/day) has reduced globally from 52% in 1981 (1.9 billion people) to 26% in 2005 (1.4 billion people).[1] The plight of pennilessness and the means to curtail it remains of high priority in the global economy of today and the majority of the underdeveloped and developing countries have made significant efforts towards reducing poverty. In some countries, non-governmental organizations have notably complimented the efforts of the national government, and thus it was realized that poverty reduction is a continuing process for poverty eradication. [2]

Over the last two decades, the rising West African country of Sierra Leone has experienced political unrest, financial havoc, and a cruel civic war during most of the 1990s. Dating back to the 1930s, gemstones have played a significant role in the overall economy and this have been a powerful feature of the rural economies and communities where they are stored. Over the last twenty years, there has been much debate about the publicly talked about "blood diamonds," which have been said to have played a major role in sustaining the conflict. The protracted conflict wrecked much of the country and this led to enormous anguish to the people, with a supposed 50,000 deaths and the ousting of over half of the inhabitants. As a result of that, everyday trading activities were badly unsettled, the majority of the country's infrastructure was dismantled and seriously wrecked, and financial hardship became extensive and thoroughly embedded. [3]

The idea of helping the needy has been in existence as long as man has travelled the earth. Nevertheless, as communities developed into nations, helping the poor was left to generous and large-hearted organizations, churches, and mainly the government. As different regimes of governments rotated, the distribution of financial assistance to the penniless was drastically reduced. Several affluent nations brought financial assistance to the needy in third-world nations by making available for their governments different credits and other loan systems, such as development banks and monetary agencies to help in reducing poverty and underdevelopment.[4] The economic and financial disaster of the 1980s, coupled with the incompetence of banks and other financial agencies, forced the extinction of banks and financial agencies that are keen on eradicating poverty. Microfinance is coming forth as a fundamental part of the new development paradigm, described by the phrase "participation and development". Although the idea has become really popular among supporting agencies, financial organizations, development practitioners, and academicians, theoretical assumptions on which this idea is founded seems entirely unexamined.[5]

The article will examine the following questions: Is microcredit a solution or part of the solution to poverty? Do non-governmental organizations play a vital role in the reduction of poverty around war-torn countries? The article suggests that microcredit is a means to poverty eradication, but not an end in itself. Efforts for operational sustainability must target not only the less poor capable of repaying loans, but include the otherwise marginalized poor.

Literature Review

The idea of microfinance has been in existence for some time, proof of credits being

given out to the poor having been seen around Europe following the 18th century. Jonathan Swift established a fund to render "poor industrious tradesmen" loans "in little sums of five and ten pounds, which were to be repaid every week at a low cost of two or four shillings, with no interest." An additional one was the Irish Reproductive Loan Fund Establishment that started around 1822 to help the impoverished by providing them with small credits under 10 Euros in modern terms. It was around the 1970s that microfinance became a present-day occurrence. The present-day idea of microcredit was initiated by Muhammad Yunus, a native of Bangladesh who was educated in the United States and later became a professor at Chittagong University around Bangladesh.[6]

Microfinance has been in existence though mainly in the dark and invisible by nonchalant spectators. It has simply been within the last forty years that conscious worldwide attempts have been made to validate economic service to the needy. This procedure began urgently around the early mid-1980s and also began to assemble an affecting drive. Presently, there are numerous microfinance institutions supporting economic assistance to a predicted 100-200 million of the earth's penniless. Now, what started as an elementary "operation" inspired greatly by an improvement example is growing into a universal corporation updated increasingly by a financial example. [7] The majority of the microfinance institutions are able to function very well because of financial aid and donations from governments and all other supporters. In spite of this, the microfinance world is governed by an organisational example maintaining that a microfinance institution should be able to pay for its functioning and funding expenditure with agenda proceeds.[8]

Economic ideologies propose that microfinance should lead to economic progress, and the progress can then directly lead to poverty eradication, regardless of the fact that there exists an outstretch counter-argument about under what state of affairs this happens. It has over time been reported that microfinance supports economic progress, but the theory that microfinance boosts economic progress has been under serious contention in hypothetical writings. It also has been called into question and investigated on a practical basis.[9] Financial institutions are essential to economic progress since they transmit community's savings to businessmen who launch their business ideas.[10] Years of battle, clashes, combat, strife, struggle, and war, and most times natural catastrophes, often results in a downturn in the good condition of life and financial prosperity in the lives of the marginalised poor in a given society. In circumstances of utter and absolute disaster, the communities almost discontinue surviving, nationwide economies collapse, and societal and governmental make-up vanishes. Microfinance, as a system of independence local monetary establishments, can have an important task in the shift from ease to rebuilding and continual growth. [11]

Ohanyan points out those two contradictory propositions have been put into practice in post-conflict Bosnia-Herzegovina. The first one views microfinance as an instantaneous peace-building tool aiming at some inhabitants and giving monetary assistance to these particular applicants. This approach is preferred by charitable establishments. which may use it to rebuild impoverished borrowers. Its intention is to provide a societal assured network and reduce the societal rate of shift. This can however divide the society.12 The other proposition is a more profit-making idea. It centres on the continuing viability of the microfinance institutions provided that contributing organizations pull back.
According to C. Van Rooyen et al, the making available of "micro" economic services to

the impoverished individuals, most especially small credits of $50-$1000, has been applauded by spokesmen as an efficient poverty reduction and growth mechanism. Regarded jointly as microfinance, these economic services consist of micro-savings, microcredit, and loans and have been credited with sanctioning micro-entrepreneurs to establish businesses and grow their income, in addition to upgrading the total economic wellbeing of the impoverished individuals. Additionally, microfinance has been ascribed as upgrading other economic outcomes (inclusive of savings plus the collection of assets, which includes furniture or other home appliances) and also non-financial results like health, nutrition, education, food-security, housing, and job-creation. [13]

Various Views of Microfinance and Microcredit

The United Nations affirmed that 2005 is the international year of Microcredit. Microcredit is the supplying of loans to impoverished borrowers and the really poor, penniless, low -income earners, unemployed women, and local borrowers, who are omitted from the prevalent financial system. It has attained a predominant place as a lending tool in the sphere of international financial resources in the last three decades. Microcredit or microfinance programs are now a known path, mainly to reach those with little or no income, who would naturally be secluded from formal financial institutions, due to the reality that they do not possess the required collateral and credit history required to lend and create their own businesses and going on to become relevant businessman or businesswoman. [14]
Microfinance relates to the providing of monetary services that includes pocket-size trading loans, to impoverished clients, commonly in poor societies, with the sole purpose of affirming economic growth through the development of entrepreneurial activity. The aim of microcredit is to help reduce poverty by entrusting the penniless to engage in markets that bring about income and to become more self-supporting and self-sustaining. The level to which microfinance encourages poverty reduction in developing market economies has been the focal point of an expanding body of inquire in the field of evolving economies. [15]

Microfinance affords the penniless an opportunity to tackle financial barrenness, provoke earnings, and capture enterprising chances, and over time the triumph of microcredit sometimes depend on individual entrepreneurs' expertise, mentality, and social connections, and also including their level of social investment and psychological capital to seek business development.[16] The Microcredit Summit of 1997 defined microcredit as "programmes which gives out small loans to the very poor people for self-employment ventures that will directly generate income, thereby allowing them to care for themselves and their immediate families."[17] Microfinance is the provision and distribution of pocket-size loans to the extremely poor in order to give them the opportunity to become entrepreneurs and self-employed to earn sufficiently high income to liberate themselves from the never-ending cycle of poverty. In its extensive sense, microcredit includes the act of making small amounts of loans available to the poor and other intended borrowers that have not been able to access loans from commercial banks due to its high interest rates. [18] Yunus states that it is crucial to distinguish microcredit in all its previous types from the specific type of credit used at the Grameen Bank, which he calls "Grameencredit." Yunus also states categorically that the "most unique feature of Grameencredit" is that it is not based on any sort of collateral or legally enforceable agreements

but rather it is based on "trust," and not on legal protocols.[19] Microcredit refers to the act of providing the loan while microfinance, is the act of providing these same borrowers with financial services, such as savings establishments and insurance policies. It encompasses the field of microcredit.[20] Microfinance is the granting of credits, funds, investments, guarantee, savings, and other monetary services to impoverished people. This is usually offered to people who do not have the required access to commercial banks or other official monetary services providers.[21]

Reconstruction After War

When the war in Sierra Leone ended, the means of living for the majority of the market women were already destroyed and lives became really hard for them. A national non-governmental organization called "Campaign for Good Governance" provided them with countless financial and technical assistance and thereafter a comeback plan was developed. This plan gave rise to a focused microcredit loan scheme that will empower women to begin selling, trading, and production activities, thereby creating a favorable condition for them to start all over again and come out of the poverty cycle. [22]

Today microcredit (small collateral free loans), which is for the primary purpose of promoting small-scale businesses and self-empowerment, is now an efficient and effective poverty reduction method for poor women in Sierra Leone. Microcredit played an important role in reconstructing the lives of market women in Sierra and began new and meaningful livelihoods for them.[23] The microcredit received by the Sierra Leonean Market Women Association have created self -employment possible for her members and also providing them with low income, and these credits have increased the occupational chances of female lenders in such activities as used clothing handling and tie-dying. This has directly provided jobs to members of the recipient's immediate families so this loan system had a wide effect that imparts national development aims of creating economic self-sufficiency and elevating the means and standards of living. The microcredit loan system in Sierra Leone has also changed the mental representation of the women about themselves and aided their growing understanding of self-development. The loan system has also made possible training opportunities for the Sierra Leone Market Women Association to update their production knowledge and skills and also intensify their views about market competition.[24] The United Nations Capital Development Fund (UNCDF) is putting to test with such funding.

Models of Microfinance in Sierra Leone

Microfinance is surely one of the main ways for continual access to funds and thus includes microcredit, small savings, and small insurance. Microfinance will surely provide support with little credit; for instance, with US$5 to US$50 and a savings down payment of less than US$1, in spite of the little size, it can be used to bring about revenue-generating activities and long-lasting employment. [25]

Saving: In 2001, Stuart Rutherford, a recognized specialist in savings for the penniless, stated this: "Even though their earnings can be erratic and inconsistent, the penniless need more revenue that what they have presently." The demand for important large funds arises from growth events such as childbirth, schooling, wedding ceremony, and death from crisis such as sickness, and from chances to devote in resources or economic activities. The most dependable and main-

Key Statistics for Finance Solace	2008	2009	2010 (to June)
No. of active savers and borrowers	15,704	17,831	18,578
Amount loaned out (billion leones)	19.4	19.7	9.6
Amount of savings (billion leones)	1.8	1.5	1.6
No. of branches	10	10	11
Gender split among borrowers: male	7,017	8,688	8,887
Gender split among borrowers: female	8,687	9,144	9,691

Source: Finance Salone [28]

tainable manner in which the penniless can acquire important large funds is to develop them somehow, or any other form from their own saving; savings-oriented monetary services for the penniless exist to help them do just that.[26]

Size of Desire for Loans: The urge for microcredit is significant and it is soaring across the country. In spite of the reality that only 10% of families currently possess bank credits outstanding, 58% are fascinated in acquiring loans in the next year. Sierra Leone remains mainly a local country, with 63% of the inhabitants living in unpalatable buildings; the majority of the country's economic activity is located in the capital city of Freetown.[27]

NGO-MFIs: There are roughly about nine effective microfinance institutions (MFIs) in Sierra Leone. Different from community financial institutions and commercial financial institutions, MFIs are not permitted to acknowledge deposits. They are moreover a main approach of monetary access to the unconstrained and local divisions of the country.[29]

Finance Salone: Finance Salone was instituted in 2005 and is potentially the principal microfinance institution in Sierra Leone. In 2010, Union Trust Bank purchased a major shareholding in it. Even with its partnership with Union Trust Bank, it is not permitted to acknowledge deposits in its own name and thus only have loan products. Finance Salone has 11 divisions operating all through the country and 6 sub-offices and it serves over 18,000 clients. Its 2009-2013 plans project additional extension. Finance Salone had (as at September 2010) a payback rate of 98% and a standard portfolio at danger below 30 days at 5%. [30]

Salone Microfinance Trust (SMT) is a microfinance institution situated in Sierra Leone that began its activities following the conclusion of the battle in Sierra Leone around 2002. It was established by the global NGO Child Fund. Meticulous microfinance started in 2003 in Sierra Leone with the aid of Microfinance Investment and Technical Assistance Facility, funded by the United Nations Development Program, the German Promotional Bank KfW, and Cordaid. Over time, they grew into a recognized institution that is authorized as a credit-only microfinance organization by the bank of Sierra Leone. The goal was to lower the susceptibility of individuals in fragile states. This project will guarantee that access to funding enable people in Sierra Leone the chance to increase or set up a business. Revenue and employment assist in rural strength and peace, so earning an income gives individuals the opportunity

to provide for their families and create a good future for themselves and their children. Their aim was to make available loans to pocket-sized businesses and also enhanced access to loans.

The Salone Microfinance Trust (SMT) has her general office in Makeni and with the credit of Cordaid, SMT was able to transmit microcredits. They were also able to extend small loans to their applicants. The majority of applicants want a credit of about 130€. Applicants of SMT have the chance to obtain a group loan or a personal loan. In the course of the coming years, SMT will lead the pioneering of several fresh loan products such as motorbike taxi loan and a solar credit. During the subsequent three years, SMT also wants to become a deposit-taking establishment as this would enable applicants of SMT to have a safe and secure place for their funds. They also want to ensure that pocket-sized businesses will have access to finance. Individuals in Sierra Leone realized that it was arduous to get finance to commence a business venture to generate money for their families. They uphold microfinance organizations around Sierra Leone in order for more individuals to have access to funds.

BRAC (Sierra Leone): This microfinance scheme was put in place in 2007 and has been formulated to supply trustworthy access to cost-effective monetary services to impoverished and marginalized women.[31] They opened their offices in Sierra Leone around 2008 and by the end of 2011, they have impacted over 700,000 Sierra Leoneans with businesses in microfinance, agriculture, poultry, livestock, health, and judicial services. Their mission is to enable individuals and societies in circumstances of poverty, ignorance, disease, and social injustice. Their involvement seeks to achieve huge scale, positive transformations via economic and social programs that will enable individuals to fulfill their potential. They make available loans to women who are overlooked by other microfinance organizations, so they give them the chance to conduct trading activities by selling products to their fellow rural societies. Recipients of loan are not mandated to make available security and also to pay back their credits on a weekly basis against ruthless interest rates [32]

By this scheme, they help the government of Sierra Leone to fulfill her target of growing a well-grounded and fully functional microfinance division. BRAC makes available pocket-size business loans to business men and women who seek to increase their business venture and these credits allows the business owners to establish fresh employment opportunities and make available fresh services. The pocket-size loans range from USD 800 to 6,000 and is made available to individuals instead of groups. In 2012, BRAC led the Youth Business Development Programme, and this is assisted by Restless Development in Sierra Leone and the goal of this program was to inspire young business men and women to create modern business models that will in turn create more employment. [33]

As of 2012, BRAC's microcredit program was operating in 43 other offices that cover a population of 123,786. The program set up 1,846 microcredit groups with 20,631 members, wherein 15,316 are borrowers. Totally, BRAC gives out credits up to USD 3,019,913 in the year 2012 and the concluding credit totalled USD 1,157,106. BRAC's pocket-size business activities are functional in 26 various offices around Sierra Leone and it attends to 7,824 people.[34]

Importance of Microcredit

Microcredit initially began as an economic means of fighting poverty and it still accom-

plishes this purpose; several organizations have sought to make a clear differentiation between the "marginally poor" and the "very poor." Microcredit uses a diverse lending method such as active and growing loans, regular repayment plans, and little or no collateral to make sure of high repayment rates among the impoverished and undeserved borrowers. Microcredit also offer small credit at the first instance, with the promise of bigger future loans for timely refunds and this juicy offer serves as a powerful driving force for a micro-entrepreneur to develop her or his business [35]

Microcredit ensures that lenders have a second means of income and this deters them from borrowing against their present consumption rate. Weekly refunds give the lenders and recipients the necessary benefit of discovering difficulties and troubles early; frequent refunds also provide better customer service, and it also help lenders with savings constraints. Local moneylenders are possibly always better informed of borrower quality and possess more efficient methods of observing and enforcing agreements than commercial banks. In other words, due to their friendly and communal ties, relevant information, and position advantage, these moneylenders are in a distinct position to lend to the poor [36]

The microcredit system is really a savings and credit program, and it makes members start cultivating the habit of savings for rainy days, and they start depositing mandatory savings before receiving any loan. The first thing an active member does is to begin to deposit a particular amount of money every week with their microfinance and this amount begins to grow. The constancy of money deposited and regular appearance in group meetings are prerequisites for receiving loans, so this makes them responsible and time conscious.[37] Microcredit provision can extend to greater levels of cognitive edge (determination, relentlessness, confidence, belief, and strength) among customers. Also, the rate to which microcredit arrangement and supplying affects the cognitive edge of customers is dependent on the level of trade help accorded to them during the borrowing process. [38]

Microcredit: A Target for Women

In Jobra (a small region of Sierra Leone), it was realized that it is always difficult for borrowers to organize themselves into groups, so to make things quite easy an intending borrower would have to convince a second person to join the group, and the two would come together to convince and enlist more members.[39] The moment a group of five has been formed, the bank would give out a loan to two members of the group, and if they could pay back in six weeks, two more members of the same group could request loans. Each group member had to present themselves to the bank to experience at least seven days of serious training on the bank's codes, customs, guidelines, and protocols and also to be tested on their understanding of the codes and conducts. This is simply to test and know the serious-minded people who really want to become members. [40]
Since its launch, Grameen Bank has formulated its reimbursement methods according to the following formula:

- Loans simply stay for one year.
- Payments are paid weekly.
- Paying back commences one week after the loan has been granted.
- A yearly interest rate of 20%is charged.
- Repayment amounts to two percent of the loan amount per week for 50 weeks.
- Interest payments amount to 2 taka every

week for every 1,000 taka of the loan amount. [41]

Any economic discussion of microcredit and microfinance is not complete without a discussion of its impact on women. The Microcredit Summit Campaign Report (2000) talks about a thousand programs in which 75%of the clients were women. A typical Sierra Leonean woman necessarily needs capital but is hindered from borrowing from banks because they require heavy collateral so lending to women has a stronger impact on the welfare of the household than lending to men. [42] Microcredit empowers women in Sierra Leone to participate in economic prosperity where they had been excluded in the past. Sierra Leone microfinance schemes have potentially expanded their outreach and become self-sustaining. They are a useful anti-poverty instrument and when the penniless, especially women, receive loan; they become economic players with power, power to improve not only their lives but the lives of their households, their societies, and societies of states. [43] Microcredit programs in Sierra Leone are now combined with health care, protective education, life and affliction insurance, orphan care, and other social services not formerly associated with microcredit.

Women were unprivileged on the basis of being women and being poor in Sierra Leone. They could not access lands and other capital resources and this was the basic limitations, together with absence of loans obtainability. In the midst of the bulk of rural and impoverished urban women dwellers, market women labelled themselves as the "poorest of the poor." They deal principally in spoilable foodstuffs at rural everyday markets. Several market women are uneducated and so unable to communicate and scribble down English. The tariff system practized in Sierra Leone is limiting. As things improved, the Sierra Leonean Market Women Association's policy was to provide microloans of about Le100, 000 (ca. $45) to each of the women in categories of 20-30 borrowers from the 26 markets in Freetown respectively. [44]

Results

There is positive reasoning to affirm that microfinance makes the social and economic circumstances stronger and healthier for the penniless. For example, "the loans agenda of Microfinance Institutions is exceptionally successful, which can be seen by the fast pay back speed, understanding created amidst the intended society and profitable developmental influence made on the receivers of the loans."[45] Microcredit has shown that extremely poor households and impoverished borrowers can benefit from greater access to loans and that this provision and distribution of loans can be an efficient tool for poverty reduction by helping and empowering women and by extension uplifting entire communities and the state at large. [46]

Microcredit has also proven that institutions do not directly suffer heavy losses from lending to the poor. Microcredit in reference to Grameen Bank has succeeded where so many others have failed. They do not suffer heavy losses due to its distinct group borrowing agreements, which enabled Grameen Bank to make sure of borrowers paying back without requiring collateral from the poor because they do not have it. [47]

Non-state microcredit has been demonstrated to be an effective measure to enable market women to participate in peace economies. Over time, attention has been focused on government schemes of microlending but now it is focused on non-state programs.[48] In the year 2000, using a grant of US$50,000 by the UK Department for International Devel-

opment (DFID), the Sierra Leonean Market Women Association established microcredit strategies to increase the standards of living of their members. The project was set out by the then Minister for Department for International Development, Claire Short, in Freetown in one of Freetown's main markets.[49] From 2000 to 2003, the plan of action was run very successfully as seen by the large access of market women to the loan support (90%of the loan funds was of great assistance to the women), the huge success proportion of projects (about 70%of microcredit beneficiaries gained from the support), and high rate of credit recovery (nearly 80%of the credits were received except for scenarios of unexpected crisis. As a positive result of the Freetown evidence, microcredit was taken to market women in six more regions in the Bonthe, Bo, Kono, Makeni, Kabala, and Kambia regions.[50]

Microcredit favored women on the political stage. It has increased active participation of women in the local areas in the rural political organizations which have alerted their sense of active participation in the economic revitalisation of their communities. The majority of women that were actively involved in the microcredit loan systems are successful entrepreneurs and they kept on doing all the household chores at home.[51]

Conclusions

The Republic of Sierra Leone, similar to its surrounding countries, is endowed with a wealth of unadulterated riches; unfortunately, the country stands as one of the impecunious in Africa. Inadequate formal education lingers on as part of the obvious issues infecting Sierra Leone, as evidenced in the education rate at 35.1% and the female education rate is at a lowly 24.4%. Sierra Leone is a member of the top 10 poorest countries around the globe with 81.5% of her populace living in total hunger and poverty. Juma, a growing business woman, says that the credits she received have transformed her life. She can now make available a bright future for her children and she is part of BRAC's microfinance unit in the Kenema district. In 2012, BRAC got across to over 19,926 people, trained 27 BRAC employees, 209 community farming promoters, 174 model agriculturist, and 3,321 general agriculturists, and farming equipment was distributed to 2,577 agriculturists, and seeds and fertilizers to 2,664 agriculturists. Thus, microcredit as evidenced in Sierra Leone is part of the solution to poverty and this case proves that non-governmental organizations have a vital role to play in the reduction of poverty around war-torn countries.

The microcredit scheme resulted to micro-solutions but this is not to state that microcredit cannot play an important role in poverty reduction. It is a means to poverty eradication and not an end in itself. Microcredit should not be seen as a key card to flush out poverty in developing countries in Africa, but as a very ideal development strategy that can be incorporated with a host of other viable options derived from rural conditions and wants. Given the uncertainty of extreme pennilessness and continual improvement, it is really difficult to figure out and calculate the growth and improvement made by the receivers of microcredit towards reaching their goals so that administrators can be able to supervise and judge the usefulness of the microcredit scheme and regulate it as necessary. In other words, the productiveness of any policy to eradicate poverty needs to be made around the definition of poverty so as to be able to calculate the number of poor and map out a microcredit program of interference to eradicate poverty and promote continual development over time.[52] If micro-

credit schemes are to act as a bedrock for the extremely poor to get accustomed to trading and services so as to increase their total welfare, while combining continuous improvement, the really important questions that needs to be cleared for Africa should be: a) Are the long-lasting poor sections of the populace involved in microcredit schemes? b) How effective are the receivers of microcredit in affecting the economic system? c) Do the actions of the microcredit receivers directly or indirectly contribute to environmental growth? [53]

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UB Global Development and Peace M.A.

College of Public and International Affairs

Global Development and Peace Careers

- Development Officer
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- Homeland Security
- International Business Overseas Liaison
- International Non-Governmental Organization Liaison
- International Security Media Analyst
- Relief Agency Officer
- Risk Analyst for International Bank or Insurance Company
- Spokesperson & more

The Master of Arts in Global Development and Peace answers the increasing demand for professionals who can navigate dynamic and complex relationships on a global level.

Program Overview

The Global Development and Peace graduate program prepares future civil servants and business leaders to respond to the needs of the increasingly international political and business climate of today's world and for careers related to global development. Within the degree students choose one of four tracks: 1. Conflict Analysis and Resolution, 2. Global Communications, 3. Global Management or 4. International Political Economy and Development. Domestic students spend a minimum of two months in an overseas internship. International students may pursue their internship either in the United States or overseas. All courses are offered in a convenient evening format, and the program can be completed in two years.

Internship and Career Opportunities

Students in the Global Development and Peace program have interned for the Council of Europe, International Institute of Connecticut, and the United Nations (Development Program, Environmental Program, Populations Fund, Youth Assembly) with a number of Permanent Missions to the United Nations. Since the program's inception in 2008, graduates have matriculated into careers with federal agencies and at major international non-governmental organizations (INGOs).

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About UB

The University of Bridgeport is an international, doctoral-intensive, comprehensive university, offering award-winning academic programs in a variety of innovative undergraduate and graduate degree programs. Our 50-acre, seaside campus overlooks Long Island Sound on Connecticut's corporate Gold Coast, and is within easy driving distance of New York City and Boston.

Our student-faculty ratio is 15:1, and our full- and part-time faculty members include Fulbright Scholars, National Science Foundation Fellows, Ford Fellows, National Endowment for the Humanities Fellows, American Council for Learned Societies Scholars and Phi Beta Kappa Scholars. Some 32 percent of our students are members of minorities and students from more than 80 countries live and learn within our community.

Miguel Arroyo
Recent Graduate

Student Testimonial

"The MA program in Global Development and Peace offers an entirely fresh way of thinking about the existing complex relationships in the world of global affairs. It provides me with a detailed assessment of the complicated interaction between existing global development models, culture, national security and identity in order to create an innovative approach in addressing the issues that were traditionally reserved for social scientists or policy makers."

Miguel Arroyo is a recent graduate of the College of Public and International Affairs B.A. program in International Political Economy and Diplomacy. He has been active in Model United Nations for many years, having led several award-winning teams and having conducted trainings for the United Nations Association across the United States.

Program of Study

The Master's in Global Development and Peace requires students to complete 36 credits and it includes an internship, a graduate tutorial and a Master's thesis. Most classes are conducted in a seminar style setting and student presentations and simulations are essential pedagogical dimensions of the program. The program typically takes two years for full-time students to complete. Students are required to have completed at least two years of university study in a second language in addition to English or must demonstrate competency at that level prior to completion of the program.

Program Core

All students share the following core courses: Conflict Analysis and Resolution, Issues in Economic Development, Sociopolitical implications (see below) of the World's Religions, Internship, Tutorial, and the final Thesis. The Global Development and Peace Program has four tracks: 1. Conflict Analysis and Resolution, 2. Global Communications, 3. Global Management and 4. International Political Economy and Development. Each of the specialized tracks include three courses in the track as well as one additional elective outside the student's selected track.

Sample Semester Breakdown of Course of Study for the Global Management Track

Courses with an * are Global Management track courses.

Semester I	
Issues in Economic Development	3
International Conflict and Negotiation	3
Sociopolitical Implications of the World Religions	3
Leadership, Teams and Managing Change*	3
Semester II	
Research Methods and International Development	3
International Issues*	3
Political and Economic Integration	3
Culture and International Development	3
Semester III	
Internship (overseas or domestic students)	3
Semester IV	
Global Market Management*	3
Tutorial	3
Thesis	3

Contact:

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For admissions information, please contact:
The Office of Graduate Admissions at 203-576-4552 or admit@bridgeport.edu

UB Master of Arts in Global Media and Communication Studies

College of Public and International Affairs

The Master of Arts in Global Media and Communication Studies is designed to prepare students to become communication specialists who can respond to the information revolution and the globalization of media.

Global Media and Communication Studies Overview

More than ever before, professionals in the communications field need intercultural sensitivity, international awareness and the ability to transcend borders and interpret the communications of other cultures.

This program is designed to prepare you to become a government, NGO or business spokesperson. It is also an excellent fit for students anticipating a career as a foreign news reporter or commentator, a webmaster or content manager for an international firm; a cross-cultural communications specialist; a public relations specialist; or a career in public diplomacy.

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The University of Bridgeport is an international, doctoral-intensive, comprehensive university, offering award-winning academic programs in a variety of innovative undergraduate and graduate degree programs. Our 50-acre, seaside campus overlooks Long Island Sound on Connecticut's corporate Gold Coast, and is within easy driving distance of New York City and Boston.

Our student-faculty ratio is 15:1, and our full- and part-time faculty members include Fulbright Scholars, National Science Foundation Fellows, Ford Fellows, National Endowment for the Humanities Fellows, American Council for Learned Societies Scholars and Phi Beta Kappa Scholars. Some 32 percent of our students are members of minorities and students from more than 80 countries live and learn within our community.

Dr. Thomas J. Ward
Dean of the College of Public and International Affairs

Program of Study

The Master of Arts in Global Media and Communication is a two-year program. It requires the completion of 36 semester hours of class work, including an internship, tutorial and thesis.

Students who enter the program are expected to have completed at least one year of college foreign language study or pass a language proficiency exam. Students who have not studied a foreign language must do such study in order to graduate. Domestic students must do the internship in a country where the foreign language that they have studied is spoken and may be done over two summers if necessary. Non-US students who speak another global language besides English may do their internship either locally or overseas.

Students may choose between one of two tracks: Global Communication and New Media Communication.

Core Curriculum

Graduate Seminar in Research Methods	3
Communication Theories	3
Advanced Intercultural Communication	3
Global Communication and Mass Media	3
Media Communication Law	3
Internship	3
Tutorial	3
Thesis or Project Demonstrating Excellence (PDE)	3
Total semester hours in the concentration:	24

Global Communication Track

Take at least three from the following including Communication and National Development:

International Advertising and Public Relations	3
Communication and National Development (required)	3
News Media and International Journalism	3
Political Communication and Public Diplomacy	3
International Conflict and Negotiation	3
International Issues	3
Global Market Management	3
One course outside the Global Communication Track	3
Total semester hours in the concentration:	12

New Media Communication Track

Take at least three from the following including New Media and Information Management:

Communication and National Development	3
New Media and Information Management (required)	3
Advanced Web Publishing and Design	3
Advanced Multimedia	3
Collaborative Design Studio I	3
Collaborative Design Studio II	3
Design Management I	3
Design Management II	3
One course outside the New Media Communication Track	3
Total semester hours in the concentration:	12

Total Semester Hours	36

Contact:

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UB Master of Arts in East Asian and Pacific Rim Studies

Concentrations

- Negotiation and Diplomacy
- International Political Economy and Development
- Global Management
- Global Communication

Program Overview

The Master of Arts in East Asian and Pacific Rim Studies is a 12-course, multidisciplinary degree program designed for current and future professionals who require an in-depth understanding of this pivotal engine of the world political economy. The curriculum is intended to equip students with the knowledge, skills and experience necessary to conduct research and interpret developments in the Pacific Rim, as well as develop a foundation in an East Asian language. The program is highlighted by practical hands-on training. As a capstone experience, students complete an overseas internship.

The program prepares students with the crucial background needed for a successful career in this emerging region, whether in business, government or academia. Students may choose from four area concentrations. Students develop an understanding of the political, economic and social issues of East Asia as well as an understanding of the role that language and culture play in its growing political economy. Students accepted into the program may choose one of four tracks in business, global communication, diplomacy or development.

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Our student-faculty ratio is 15:1, and our full- and part-time faculty members include Fulbright Scholars, National Science Foundation Fellows, Ford Fellows, National Endowment for the Humanities Fellows, American Council for Learned Societies Scholars and Phi Beta Kappa Scholars. Some 32 percent of our students are members of minorities and students from more than 80 countries live and learn within our community.

Contact Information:

Office of Admissions

University of Bridgeport

126 Park Avenue

Bridgeport, CT 06604

203.576.4552

admit@bridgeport.edu

Career Tracks

With a Master of Arts in East Asian and Pacific Rim Studies, graduates look forward to careers including: international public servant, diplomat, foreign affairs specialist, trade relations specialist, intelligence specialist, regional labor relations specialist, NGO manager, international security expert, international banker, insurance company risk analyst, journalist, educator or researcher focusing on East Asia and the Pacific Rim.

Overseas Internship

An integral part of the program is a minimum two-month overseas internship at one of the institutions or companies in China, Korea, Taiwan and Japan with which the university has established contacts. UB students from East Asia may be exempt from an overseas internship and can intern in the United States.

Taking part in an internship gives students hands-on experience using professional skills necessary for success in business, government and other venues where knowledge of East Asian and Pacific Rim languages and culture is vital.

Because of the challenging nature of East Asian languages, one of the most important aspects of the internship is the exposure to and use of a language the student has studied. This immersion experience focused on language, culture and protocol in professional and academic settings offers participants unique insight to the varied dimensions of the East-West exchange. At the conclusion of the internship students submit a report on their experience.

Program Curriculum

The East Asian and Pacific Rim Studies Program requires a minimum of 36 credit hours. The program requires five semesters including an overseas internship. Students can choose to complete an internship the summer prior to the second year or in the fall of the second year.

Core Competencies (6 Semester Hours): Required for all program tracks.

Research Methods	3
Conflict Analysis and Resolution	3

Regional and Cultural Competencies (9 Semester Hours):

Sociopolitical Implications of the World's Religions	3
Political and Economic Integration of the Pacific Rim	3

Capstone Core Courses (9 Semester Hours)

Internship	3
Tutorial*	3
Thesis	3

*The Tutorial includes comprehensive oral and written exams.

Concentrations

A: Negotiation and Diplomacy Track (12 Semester Hours)

Political Communication and Governance	3
The Culture of Diplomacy – East Asia and the West	3
Advanced Diplomacy	3
One Course in on Concentration B, C or D	3

B: International Political Economy and Development Track (12 Semester Hours)

Sustainable Development	3
Models of Good Governance in the Asia-Pacific Region	3
Business and Diplomacy – East Asia vs. the West	3
One Course in Concentration A, C or D	3

C: Global Management Track (12 Semester Hours)

Leadership, Teams and Managing Change	3
International Issues	3
Global Market Management*	3
One Course in Concentration A, B or D	3

D: Global Communication Track (12 Semester Hours)

Global Communication and Mass Media	3
Communication and National Development	3
Political Communication and Governance	3
One Course in Concentration A, B or C	3

*In certain cases, other International Political Economy and Development courses may be substituted following approval from the Program Chair.

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
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